| Description |
1 online resource (45 pages) |
| Series |
IMF Working Papers |
|
IMF Working Papers
|
| Contents |
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model without Private Information; Figure 1; A. Regulatory Architectures: Unified vs Multiple Regulators; B. Equilibrium in a Multi-Regulator Architecture; Figure 2; Figure 3; C. Equilibrium in a Unified Regulator Architecture; 1. Non-systemic bank; Figure 4; 2. Systemic bank; Figure 5; D. Comparing Multiple- vs Unified-Regulator Architectures; 1. Non-Systemic bank; 2. Systemic bank; Table 1; III. The Model with Private Information; A. Information Sharing; 1. The DI has incentive to act strategically |
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2. Communication is innefectiveFigure 6; B. Information Gathering; IV. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes |
| Summary |
Until the recent financial crisis, the safety and soundness of financial institutions was assessed from the perspective of the individual institution. The financial crisis highlighted the need to take systemic externalities seriously when rethinking prudential oversight and the regulatory architecture. Current financial reform legislation worldwide reflects this intent. However, these reforms have overlooked the need to also consider regulatory agencies' forbearance and information sharing incentives. In a political economy model that explicitly accounts for systemic connectedness, and regulat |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Banks and banking -- State supervision -- Econometric models
|
|
Liquidity (Economics) -- Econometric models
|
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Liquidity (Economics) -- Econometric models
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Matta, Rafael
|
|
Kahn, Charles M
|
|
Sole, Juan
|
| ISBN |
9781463900984 |
|
1463900988 |
|
