| Description |
1 online resource (35 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Discussion paper series, 0265-8003 ; no. 15554 Industrial organization |
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Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)) ; no. 15554.
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| Summary |
An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of a good that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies (technology banding)? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the nature of the available technologies, the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs, the costs of public funds, and the degree of market power. Using Spanish data on recently deployed renewables across the country, we illustrate how our theory can shed light on how to more effectively procure these technologies. Beyond this motivation/application, the question of how to procure public goods in the presence of multiple technologies is relevant for a wide variety of goods, including central banks liquidity, pollution reduction, or land conservation, among others |
| Notes |
"First published 13 December 2020" |
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"This revision 17 February 2021" |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-35) |
| Notes |
Description based on online resource; title from http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15554 viewed March 9, 2022 |
| Subject |
Government purchasing -- Economic aspects
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Price discrimination -- Economic aspects
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Auctions -- Economic aspects
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Auctions -- Economic aspects.
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Government purchasing -- Economic aspects.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Montero, Juan-Pablo, author.
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), publisher.
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