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Author Petro, Stephen, author

Title Rationality, virtue, and liberation : a post-dialectical theory of value / Stephen Petro
Published Cham : Springer, 2014
Table of Contents
1.Introduction1
2.Rethinking Rationality9
2.1.The Reconciliation of Ethical Rationalism, Ethical Naturalism, Virtue Ethics, and the Biological and Social Sciences9
2.1.1.Reasserting the Compatibility of the Methodologies of Value Theory and of the Sciences10
2.1.2.Reasserting the Compatibility of Virtue Ethics and Deontological Rationalism24
2.2.The Failure of Axiological Anti-foundationalism29
2.2.1.The Ideological Dangers of Anti-foundationalism29
2.2.2.The Problem of Indeterminacy: Amartya Sen's Theory of Justice32
2.2.3.Karl-Otto Apel's Rebuttal to the Munchhausen Trilemma and Its Relevance to Value Theory35
2.3.The Concept of Rationality: Toward a Universal Model36
2.3.1.Concepts, Conceptions, and the Possibility of a Universal Model37
2.3.2."Humaniqueness," Social Cognitive Theory, and a Neuroscientific Account of Judgment40
2.3.3.Inadequacies and Limitations of Competing Accounts45
2.3.4.The Necessary Methodological Preconditions of Universal Applicability53
2.3.5.The Model Explicated and Analyzed54
2.3.6.Consequences for a Doctrine of Liberation61
2.4.Concluding Remarks63
3.Rationality and Dialectical Necessity65
3.1.Prescription, Preference, and Dialectical Contingence65
3.1.1.A Refutation of Harean Anti-descriptivism67
3.1.2.Hare's Dialectical Method79
3.2.Developing a Method of Justification91
3.2.1.The Problem of a Justificatory Method91
3.2.2.Problems in Walton's Model of Justification93
3.2.3.The Justificatory Model Explicated and Analyzed97
3.3.A Sound Positive Account, Part I: An Analysis of Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism106
3.3.1.The Basic Elements of Gewirthian Theory106
3.3.2.The Premises and Conclusion Reconstructed and Analyzed111
3.3.3.Applications to Animal Ethics and the Principle of Proportionality114
3.3.4.Applications to Positive Rights120
3.3.5.Applications to Classic Moral Dilemmas, the Principle of Double Effect, and Intention122
3.3.6.Position A: Incompleteness and Equal Justifiability127
3.3.7.Position B: The Self-Contract129
3.3.8.Position C: Double Effect, Contrary Double Effect, and Synthetic Double Effect Derived from the PGC133
3.3.9.Conclusion and Synthesis135
3.4.A Sound Positive Account, Part II: An Analysis of Habermas's Discourse Ethics139
3.4.1.Critical Theory, Interaction, and Communicative Ethics142
3.4.2.Habermas, Gewirth, and the Inescapability from the Monological147
3.4.3.Clarifying the Mirror Image150
3.4.4.Epistemological Uncertainty and Alter-Contradiction: A Reconstruction of the Habermasean Argument153
3.4.5.Applications to Moral Dilemmas: The Right to Discourse155
3.4.6.Applications to Property Theory157
3.4.7.The Baker and the Starving Man162
3.4.8.The Right to Discourse, Self-Sacrifice, and the Antique Clock165
3.4.9.Historical Arguments for a Reinterpretation of Habermasean Ethics169
3.4.10.Concluding Remarks: The Single-Person Problem172
4.The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments175
4.1.The Dialectical Structure of "Ought" and "Must"175
4.1.1.The Harean Account of Imperative, Indicative, and Conditional Statements175
4.1.2.Actuality, Subjunctivity, and Conditionality178
4.1.3.Implications of Gewirthian Theory for Deontic Meaning188
4.2.The Dialectical Structure of Rights and Duties190
4.2.1.Relativism and the Correlativity of Rights, Duties, and "Must"190
4.2.2.Rights, Duties, and Anachronism193
4.2.3.Concluding Remarks194
5.Virtue and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness197
5.1.Magnell's Challenge197
5.1.1.Probing the Predicative-Attributive Distinction198
5.1.2.The Definitive Criteria for Value Intrinsicality200
5.2.Problems in Searle's Epistemology of Function202
5.2.1.The Social Construction of Function202
5.2.2.The Problem of Classification in the Absence of Essence205
5.2.3.Functions, Mental States, and the Background209
5.2.4.Concluding Remarks210
5.3.The Life Framework: The Significance of Foot's Virtue Theory212
5.3.1.Function, Necessity, and the Grammar of Goodness213
5.3.2.The Magnitude of the Implications216
6.Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness221
6.1.Reflexive Intrinsicality and the Teleologically Comparative Tendential Necessity of Functions222
6.1.1.Assaying Some Peculiarities222
6.1.2.The Good-for Thesis223
6.1.3.The Reflexive Intrinsicality of Goodness224
6.1.4.Tendency, Necessity, and Function226
6.1.5.Applications to Goodness232
6.1.6.A Naturalistic Definition of Goodness234
6.1.7.First Proof of Intrinsic Goodness236
6.1.8.Second Proof of Intrinsic Goodness238
6.1.9.The Universality of Goodness and the Comparison of Goods240
6.1.10.Objection to Betterness and Reply242
6.1.11.A Naturalistic Definition of Betterness243
6.1.12.Objections and Replies246
6.1.13.Teleological Comparativeness248
6.1.14.Objections and a Reply via the Argument to the Commensurability of Teloi250
6.1.15.Comparison and the Telos of Betterness252
6.1.16.Another Objection to the Commensurability of Teloi and a Reply256
6.1.17.Conceptual Connections to the Non-Descriptivist Fallacy259
6.1.18.Objections on Grounds of Inherent Relativity and a Reply260
6.1.19.Objection on Grounds of Failure to Prove that Value Is a Natural Property and a Reply262
6.1.20.Objection on Grounds of Dialectical Necessity and a Reply263
6.1.21.Objection on Grounds of the Intrinsicality-Finality Distinction and a Reply264
6.1.22.Final Considerations: The Inadequacy of Summation and Aggregative Models of Value265
6.2.The Summum Bonum267
6.2.1.From Value to Rationality: The Fundamental Link Elucidated268
6.2.2.Justifying a Summum Bonum272
6.2.3.Logical Judgment275
6.2.4.Conceptual Synthesis276
6.2.5.Conceptual Abstraction278
6.2.6.Freedom279
6.2.7.Wisdom and the Unity of the Virtues281
6.2.8.Objections and Reply282
6.2.9.The Question of Attainability284
6.2.10.Phronesis, Eudaimonia, and Nirvana287
6.2.11.The Question of Individual Telos290
6.2.12.Some Implications for Aesthetics291
6.2.13.The Question of Individual Telos Revisited: The Relevance of Phenomenology292
6.2.14.Gewirth and Habermas Revisited296
6.2.15.The Single-Person Problem Resolved298
6.2.16.The Final Assessment: Choosing a Model299
6.3.Conclusion300
6.3.1.The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum300
6.3.2.Enlightenment and Liberation302
7.Conclusion309
7.1.The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum309
7.2.Enlightenment and Liberation310
7.3.Preliminary Implications for Political Theory313
 Bibliography319
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Description 1 online resource (xiii, 327 pages) : illustrations
Series Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, 1387-6678 ; volume 33
Library of ethics and applied philosophy ; v. 33. 1387-6678
Contents Rethinking Rationality -- Rationality and Dialectical Necessity -- The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments -- Rationality, Virtue, and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness -- Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness
Summary This book explores the overlooked but vital theoretical relationships between R.M. Hare, Alan Gewirth, and Jorgen Habermas. The author claims their accounts of value, while failing to address classic virtue-theoretical critiques, bear the seeds of a resolution to the ultimate question "What is most valuable?" These dialectical approaches, as claimed, justify a reinterpretation of value and value judgment according to the Carnapian conception of an empirical-linguistic framework or grammar. Through a further synthesis with the work of Philippa Foot and Thomas Magnell, the author shows that value would be literally meaningless without four fundamental phenomena which constitute such a framework: Logical Judgment, Conceptual Synthesis, Conceptual Abstraction, and Freedom. As part of the 'grammar of goodness, ' the excellence of these phenomena, in a highly concrete way, constitute the essence of the greatest good, as this book explains
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references
Notes Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed November 25, 2013)
Subject Values.
Ethics.
Rationalism.
Form Electronic book
ISBN 3319022857 (electronic bk.)
9783319022857 (electronic bk.)