Description |
1 online resource |
Series |
Oxford moral theory |
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Oxford moral theory.
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Contents |
1.1 Moral Psychology 1 -- 1.2 Reason and Appetite 2 -- 1.3 Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Realizer Desires 6 -- 1.4 The Many Guises of the Good 14 -- 1.5 The Work to Be Done 16 -- Part I Reason -- 1 Deliberation 19 -- 1.1 The Nature of Deliberation 21 -- 1.2 The Rationality of Acts of Deliberation 26 -- 1.3 Deliberation and Regress 29 -- 1.4 Other Objections 33 -- 1.5 Deliberative Exceptionalism 36 -- 1.6 Is There an Ambiguity? 37 -- 1.7 If Not Deliberation, Then Representation? 40 -- 1.8 Thinking and Acting for Reasons without Deliberation 42 -- 2 How Deliberation Works 43 -- 2.1 The Role of Deliberation 43 -- 2.2 How Deliberation Works 47 -- 2.3 The Moral of the Story 50 -- 3 Thinking and Acting for Reasons 53 -- 3.1 Objective Reasons and Rationalizing Reasons 53 -- 3.2 Physical Properties, Contents, and Reasons 56 -- 3.3 Because of Reasons 61 -- 3.4 Reasons, Causes, and Mountain Climbers 67 -- 3.5 Acting for Bad Reasons 72 -- 3.6 Thinking and Acting for Multiple Reasons and Nonreasons 75 -- 3.7 Habit and Inaction 80 -- 3.8 Acting for Moral Reasons 86 -- Part II Desire -- 4 Love and Care 93 -- 4.1 Love 93 -- 4.2 Care 104 -- 5 What Desires Are Not 110 -- 5.1 Action Is Not the Essence of Desire 111 -- 5.2 Feeling Is Not the Essence of Desire 116 -- 6 What Desires Are 126 -- 6.1 The Reward and Punishment Systems 127 -- 6.2 The Reward System Causes What Desires Cause 137 -- 6.3 Intrinsic Desires are a Natural Kind 143 -- 6.4 Solutions and Promissory Notes 146 -- Part III Virtue -- 7 Credit and Blame 159 -- 7.1 Attributability and Accountability 159 -- 7.2 Good Will and Ill Will 162 -- 7.3 A Theory of Praise-and Blameworthiness 169 -- 7.4 Side Constraints 171 -- 7.5 Conceptualization 176 -- 7.6 Too Much Credit, Too Much Blame 187 -- 7.7 Partial Good and 111 Will 194 -- 8 Virtue 200 -- 8.1 A Theory of Virtue 202 -- 8.2 The Theory Applied 203 -- 8.3 Virtues and Their Effects 206 -- 8.4 Virtue and Involuntary Attitudes: Two Alternative Views 215 -- 8.5 Virtuous Irrationality 219 -- 8.6 The Unity of the Virtues 221 -- 9 Virtue and Cognition 225 -- 9.1 Familiar Cognitive Effects of Desire 226 -- 9.2 The Effects of Good Will on Cognition 231 -- 9.3 The Vice of Being Prejudiced 233 -- 9.4 The Vice of Being Close-Minded 239 -- 9.5 The Virtue of Being Open-Minded 241 -- 9.6 Modesty and Immodesty 245 -- 9.7 Vicious Dreams 250 -- Part IV Puzzles -- 10 Inner Struggle 259 -- 10.1 Akrasia 259 -- 10.2 The Experience of Inner Struggle 261 -- 10.3 Inner Struggle Explained 265 -- 11 Addiction 274 -- 11.1 The Puzzle 274 -- 11.2 The Science of Addiction 276 -- 11.3 The Philosophy of Addiction 285 -- 11.4 The Blameworthiness of Addicts 287 -- 11.5 Addiction in Moral Psychology 289 |
Summary |
'In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
Notes |
Print version record |
Subject |
Desire (Philosophy)
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Ethics.
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Virtue.
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Virtues.
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Ethics
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ethics (philosophy)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
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Desire (Philosophy)
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Ethics
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Virtue
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Virtues
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Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
Schroeder, Timothy, author
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ISBN |
9780199348176 |
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0199348170 |
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9780199348183 |
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0199348189 |
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