| Description |
1 online resource (331 p.) |
| Series |
Law and Practical Reason Ser |
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Law and Practical Reason Ser
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| Contents |
Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- I. Aims and structure of the work -- 1. Law, Power, and Political Authority. On the Scope and Limitations of the Work -- I. Introduction -- II. Brief Methodological Remarks -- III. The Province of the problem Determined: What is Law? -- IV. Politics, Political Power, Political Authority -- V. From Powers to Power. The Familiar Tale of the Ineluctability of the State -- VI. The Conditions of Existence of Political Authority: insights from the theory of normative orders |
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2. The Dependence of Constitutional Democracy on the Distinction between Creation and Application of Law -- I. Introduction -- II. The Contested Relationship between Law and Politics -- III. Law as lex and as ius: the duality that makes constitutionalism possible -- IV. From constitutions to constitutionalism: narrowing the focus of constitutional theory -- V. The (proverbial) tension between democracy and constitutionalism -- VI. Modern constitutionalism as 'legal otherness' -- VII. The two-fold justificatory dependence of constitutional democracy on the idea of application of law |
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3. A Critical Evaluation of Moderate Legal Realism -- I. Introduction -- II. Realism vs formalism -- III. Let us be realist about adjudication. What do judges eat for breakfast? -- IV. Realism and realisms in law: meta-theory -- V. The lowest common denominator of legal realism -- VI. The two axes of rule-scepticism -- VII. The unbearable lightness of moderate scepticism -- VIII. On the normativity of law, and on the digestion of judges -- 4. Towards a Unified Account of Discretion in Law -- I. Introduction -- II. HLA Hart and the concept of discretion. Back to the future? |
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III. Dworkin and the (normative) no-strong-discretion thesis -- IV. Discretion as a pervasive feature of Kelsen's Stufenbaulehre -- V. Discretion as balancing in Klatt (and Alexy) -- VI. The history of discretion in the administrative domain -- VII. Administrative discretion in Germany -- VIII. Discretion in the French-Italian administrative tradition -- IX. The concept of discretion in English administrative law -- X. Towards a unified account of discretion in law -- XI. Conclusion -- 5. Law and Language and as Language. An Alternative Picture of a Multifaceted Relationship -- I. Introduction |
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II. The communicative model of law. A two-way affair? -- III. Beyond 'what is said'. Speech-act theory and the rise of pragmatics in legal interpretation -- IV. First objection: law as language, law and language(s) -- V. Second objection: speech-act vs text-act theory -- VI. Legal texts as 'autonomous' text-acts -- VII. An alternative theory of legal meaning: semantic minimalism -- VIII. Prolegomena to a theory of legal interpretation -- IX. Conclusion -- 6. Creation and Application of Law. An Analytical Distinction -- I. Introduction -- II. The two extremes: rejecting vs assuming the distinction |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
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III. Kelsen on the relativity of the distinction between creation and application of law |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781509905232 |
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1509905235 |
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