Table of Contents |
| List of abbreviations | xii |
| Table of cases | xv |
1. | Introduction | 1 |
1. | Relevance of emissions trading | 1 |
2. | History of emissions trading | 2 |
3. | Aspects of emissions trading design | 5 |
4. | Purpose of the book | 6 |
5. | Acknowledgements | 8 |
2. | Emissions trading and alternative instruments | 10 |
1. | Introduction | 10 |
2. | Command and control versus economic incentive-based or market-based instruments | 12 |
2.1. | Weaknesses of command and control | 12 |
3. | Environmental liability as an incentive-based instrument | 14 |
3.1. | Environmental liability versus regulation | 17 |
4. | Environmental taxation | 21 |
5. | Emissions trading | 23 |
5.1. | Advantages of emissions trading | 24 |
5.2. | Critical issues | 25 |
6. | Concluding remarks | 27 |
3. | Design variants of emissions trading | 30 |
1. | Introduction | 30 |
2. | Policy context | 31 |
2.1. | Political factors | 32 |
2.2. | Economic factors | 35 |
2.3. | Social factors | 38 |
2.4. | Conclusion | 38 |
3. | Policy objectives | 39 |
3.1. | Environmental effectiveness | 40 |
3.2. | Cost effectiveness (lowest abatement costs) | 41 |
3.3. | Raising government income | 42 |
3.4. | Economic growth | 43 |
3.5. | Investment incentives | 46 |
3.6. | Summary | 48 |
4. | Design choices | 48 |
4.1. | Participation and coverage | 49 |
4.2. | Target setting | 53 |
4.3. | Cap-and-trade, credit trading and intensity targets | 55 |
4.4. | Monitoring, reporting and verification | 57 |
4.5. | Energy-intensive trade-exposed industries | 57 |
4.6. | Allocation rules | 58 |
4.7. | Closure rules, transfer rules, ex post adjustment | 59 |
4.8. | Linking | 60 |
4.9. | Flexibility measures | 61 |
4.10. | The secondary market | 64 |
5. | Conclusion | 64 |
4. | Real-life applications of emissions trading systems | 66 |
1. | Introduction | 66 |
2. | Europe | 67 |
2.1. | European Union Emissions Trading System | 67 |
2.2. | Swiss Emissions Trading Scheme | 72 |
3. | North America | 74 |
3.1. | United States Sulphur Dioxide Cap-and-Trade Programme | 74 |
3.2. | Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative | 75 |
3.3. | Western Climate Initiative | 77 |
3.4. | Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord | 82 |
4. | Australia and New Zealand | 82 |
4.1. | Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism | 82 |
4.2. | New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme | 85 |
5. | Asia | 87 |
5.1. | Japan | 87 |
5.2. | China's emissions trading systems | 89 |
6. | Conclusions | 96 |
5. | Implementation issue 1: Initial allocation of emission rights | 99 |
1. | Introduction | 99 |
2. | Setting the emissions cap | 100 |
2.1. | Over-allocation | 100 |
2.2. | Options to tackle over-allocation | 104 |
3. | Free allocation of emission rights | 106 |
3.1. | Free allocation under an emissions cap | 106 |
3.2. | Free allocation under a credit-and-trade system | 107 |
3.3. | Windfall profits | 109 |
3.4. | Options for tackling windfall profits | 111 |
4. | Auctioning of emission rights | 113 |
4.1. | Advantages of allowance auctioning | 113 |
4.2. | Examples of allowance auctions | 114 |
4.3. | Allowance auction design | 115 |
5. | Lobbying for more or cheaper emission rights | 118 |
5.1. | Lobbying and inefficiencies | 119 |
5.2. | Lobbying in the European Union ETS | 119 |
6. | Conclusion | 124 |
6. | Implementation issue 2: The secondary market for emission rights | 125 |
1. | Introduction | 125 |
2. | Spot market and manipulation | 126 |
2.1. | Action-based manipulation | 128 |
2.2. | Information-based manipulation | 130 |
2.3. | Trade-based manipulation | 131 |
2.4. | Concluding remarks | 131 |
3. | Auctioning and manipulation | 132 |
3.1. | Market manipulation and auction design | 133 |
3.2. | Auction regulation and market manipulation | 135 |
3.3. | Concluding remarks | 141 |
4. | Documented market irregularities | 141 |
4.1. | VAT fraud | 142 |
4.2. | Theft | 143 |
4.3. | Nation state creativity | 143 |
4.4. | Concluding remarks | 144 |
5. | Conclusion | 145 |
7. | Implementation issue 3: Operational aspects of emission rights | 147 |
1. | Introduction | 147 |
2. | Monitoring, reporting and verification | 147 |
3. | Working of the market (the case of state-owned enterprises) | 150 |
4. | Transaction logs | 151 |
4.1. | Information security and privacy | 156 |
4.2. | Research on allowance transactions | 160 |
5. | Conclusion | 161 |
8. | Implementation issue 4: Lawsuits following from emissions trading | 163 |
1. | Introduction | 163 |
2. | The object of the legal claim | 164 |
2.1. | Statutory challenges | 165 |
2.2. | Challenges against the implementation of the law | 168 |
2.3. | Challenges against the enforcement of the law | 172 |
2.4. | International law issues | 174 |
2.5. | Challenges brought by enforcement agencies | 176 |
3. | Specific legal areas | 177 |
3.1. | Liability | 177 |
3.2. | Property rights | 178 |
3.3. | Consumer protection | 179 |
4. | Critical legal issues in enacting an ETS | 180 |
4.1. | Legal standing | 180 |
4.2. | Legitimate expectations | 185 |
4.3. | Precautionary principle | 186 |
5. | Concluding remarks | 187 |
9. | Linking emissions trading schemes | 188 |
1. | Introduction | 188 |
2. | Background | 189 |
3. | Benefits of linking | 191 |
4. | Barriers to linking | 192 |
4.1. | Coverage of the schemes | 194 |
4.2. | Stringency of the political target | 195 |
4.3. | Nature of the policy instrument | 196 |
4.4. | Allocation mechanisms | 198 |
4.5. | New entrants | 199 |
4.6. | Ex post adjustments | 200 |
4.7. | Leakage safeguards | 201 |
4.8. | Offset provisions | 203 |
4.9. | Banking and borrowing | 204 |
4.10. | Environmental effectiveness | 205 |
4.11. | Privacy and data protection | 205 |
5. | Practical experiences | 206 |
6. | Conclusion | 207 |
10. | Concluding remarks | 208 |
1. | Introduction | 208 |
2. | Why? | 209 |
3. | How? | 210 |
4. | What? | 212 |
5. | With whom? | 215 |
6. | Final remarks | 216 |
| References | 217 |
| Index | 239 |