| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Ser. ; v. 13 |
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Oxford Studies in Metaethics Ser
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| Contents |
Cover; Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 13; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1: Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?; 1.1. SUPERVENIENCE OF THE NORMATIVE; 1.1.1. Epistemic, Aesthetic, Moral, and Normative Supervenience; 1.1.2. Normative Supervenience; 1.2. SUPERVENIENCE AND DEPENDENCE; 1.3. RADICAL HOLISM AND IRREDUCIBLE THICKNESS; 1.4. ARGUMENTS AND REPLIES; 1.4.1. The Consistency Argument; 1.4.2. The Grounding Argument; 1.4.3. The Conceivability Argument; 1.5. GOOD NEWS FOR NON-REDUCTIVISTS AND NON-NATURALISTS?; 1.5.1. The 'Reduction' Objection |
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1.5.2. The 'Explanation' Objection1.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS; References; 2: Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative; 2.1. NON-NATURALISM AND THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE; 2.2. MODAL REALISM AND QUASI-REALISM; 2.3. THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE REVISITED; 2.4. CONCLUSION; References; 3: Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace; 3.1. INTRODUCTION; 3.2. THE CORE IDEA; 3.3. COGNITION AND DESCRIPTION; 3.4. NON-DESCRIPTIVE CONTENTS: SETS OF WORLD-STANCE PAIRS |
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3.5. CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVALUATION: WORLDS AND WORLD-STANCE PAIRS3.6. THE TRUTH IN VALUES; 3.7. PSYCHOLOGY; 3.8. DISAGREEMENT; 3.9. MORE FREGE-GEACH ROLES; 3.10. CONCLUSION; References; 4: How to Learn about Aesthetics and Morality through Acquaintance and Deference; 4.1. THE PUZZLE OF MORAL AND AESTHETIC DEFERENCE; 4.2. ACQUAINTANCE, APPRECIATIVE KNOWLEDGE, AND THE POSSESSION OF REASONS; 4.2.1. The Perks of Aesthetic Acquaintance; 4.2.2. Acquaintance and the Possession of Reasons; 4.2.3. The Downsides (and Upsides) of Aesthetic Deference; 4.3. GENERALIZING TO THE MORAL CASE |
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4.3.1. Becoming Acquainted with Moral Acquaintance4.3.2. The Downsides (and Upsides) of Moral Deference; 4.4. ACCESS AND ACQUAINTANCE; 4.4.1. Ground Clearing; 4.4.2. Accessing Moral Properties Directly; 4.4.3. The Lack of Armchair Access Objection; 4.5. CONCLUSION; References; 5: Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology; 5.1. INTRODUCTION; 5.2. EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS OF MORAL JUDGEMENTS; 5.3. A GENERIC DEBUNKING ARGUMENT; 5.4. REDUNDANCY; 5.5. FURTHER ARGUMENTS; 5.5.1. Sensitivity; 5.5.2. Other Arguments; 5.6. LACK OF METHOD; 5.6.1. Pure Epistemology |
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5.6.2. An Alternative Reply5.6.2.1. General Principle; 5.6.2.2. Formal vs. Substantive Assumptions; 5.6.2.3. Epistemology for Mind-Dependent Conceptions of Moral Truth; 5.6.2.4. Epistemology for Mind-Independent Conceptions of Moral Truth; 5.6.2.5. Summary and Objection; 5.7. CONCLUSION; References; 6: The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation; 6.1. THE RATIONALITY OF PMM; 6.1.1. Pure Moral Inquiry with Full Information; 6.1.2. Pure Moral Inquiry with Conceptual Limitations; 6.2. NON-COGNITIVISM; 6.3. AN EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINT; 6.4. SYNTHETIC NATURALISM; 6.5. NON-NATURALISM; 6.6. ANALYTIC NATURALISM |
| Summary |
'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field |
| Notes |
This edition previously issued in print: 2018 |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Audience |
Specialized |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 29, 2018) |
| Subject |
Ethics.
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Metaethics.
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ethics (philosophy)
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Ethics
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Metaethics
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Shafer-Landau, Russ, editor.
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| ISBN |
9780191862625 |
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0191862622 |
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9780192557162 |
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0192557165 |
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