| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover; Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 14; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1: How Principles Ground; 1.1. THE NATURAL ROBUST REALIST PICTURE; 1.2. BERKER'S CHALLENGE; 1.3. HOW LAW GROUNDS; 1.4. BACK TO MORALITY; 1.5. ANOTHER ROUND; 1.6. WHEN ARE HUMEAN LAWS ENOUGH?; 1.7. OTHER METAETHICAL PAYOFFS OF GROUNDING PLURALISM; References; 2: The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement; 2.1. INTRODUCTION; 2.2. ARGUMENTS FROM CONCILIATIONISM; 2.3. ARGUMENTS FROM THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE METHOD OF MORAL INQUIRY; 2.4. IBE ARGUMENTS FROM INTRACTABLE DISAGREEMENT |
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2.5. ARGUMENTS FROM DISAGREEMENT IN IDEAL CONDITIONS2.6. CONCLUSION; References; 3: Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds; 3.1. INTRODUCTION; 3.2. DISAGREEMENT AND ARBITRARINESS; 3.3. EPISTEMIC MODALS, DISAGREEMENT, AND PROPOSITION CLOUDS; 3.4. MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND PROPOSITION CLOUDS; 3.5. THE ALTERNATIVES; References; 4: Taking Prudence Seriously; 4.1. INTRODUCTION; 4.2. PRUDENTIAL REASONS; 4.2.1. Objection 1: All Reasons are Agent Neutral; 4.2.2. Objection 2: Humeanism about Reasons; 4.3. THE PARITY STRATEGY (I) : THE POSITIVE CASE; 4.3.1. Markers of Normativity |
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4.3.1.1. Evaluative and Prescriptive4.3.1.2. Authority; 4.3.1.3. Affective Connection; 4.3.1.4. Disagreement; 4.4. OBJECTIONS TO PJN; 4.4.1. Objection 1: Prudential Value is Desire-Based; 4.4.2. Objection 2: Reductionism about Prudential Properties; 4.4.3. Objection 3: Prudential Reasons are Different from Moral Reasons; 4.5. CONCLUSION; References; 5: Internalism and Prudential Value; 5.1. THE STRUCTURE OF GOOD; 5.2. EXISTENCE INTERNALISM AND PRUDENTIAL VALUE; 5.2.1. Internalism and Theories of Welfare; 5.2.1.1. Hedonism; 5.2.1.2. Desire Fulfillment Theories; 5.2.1.3. Objective List Theories |
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5.2.2. Further Objections5.3. MOTIVATION TO PURSUE THE GOOD?; 5.3.1. Two-Tier Internalism?; 5.4. CONCLUSION; References; 6: Desiring under the Proper Guise; 6.1. INTRODUCTION; 6.2. THE GUISE OF THE NORMATIVE; 6.3. PROPERTITIONAL DESIRE; 6.4. THE STRUCTURE OF GOOD; 6.5. THE ACCURACY CONSTRAINT; 6.6. PROBLEM CASES; 6.7. CONSTRAINTS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY; 6.8. REASONS SUPPORT PROPERTIES; 6.9. DESIRE AND THE GUISE OF REASONS; 6.10. CONCLUSION; References; 7: Infinitism about Cross-Domain Conflict; 7.1. INTRODUCTION; 7.2. THE ARGUMENT FOR INFINITISM ABOUT CROSS-DOMAIN CONFLICT |
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7.2.1. From the Overriding View to Novel Higher-Order Domains7.2.1.1. Incomparability and Comparability Without Determination; 7.2.1.2. Comparability With Determination; 7.2.1.3. Novel Higher-Order Domains; 7.2.2. From Novel Higher-Order Domains to Infinitism about Cross-Domain Conflict; 7.2.2.1. Higher-Order Domains Ground Cross-Domain Overriding; 7.2.2.2. Authority and the Beginning of the Regress; 7.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; References; 8: We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too; 8.1.; 8.2.; 8.3.; 8.4.; 8.5.; 8.6.; References; 9: Reason without Reasons For; 9.1.; 9.1.1.; 9.1.2.; 9.2 |
| Summary |
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and indexes |
| Notes |
9.2.1 |
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Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on August 02, 2019) |
| Subject |
Ethics.
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Ethics
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ethics (philosophy)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Social.
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Ethics
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Shafer-Landau, Russ, editor.
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| ISBN |
0192578456 |
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9780192578457 |
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9780191876950 |
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019187695X |
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