Title Rationality, virtue, and liberation : a post-dialectical theory of value / Stephen Petro

Published Cham : Springer, 2014

Table of Contents
1.	Introduction					1
2.	Rethinking Rationality					9
2.1.	The Reconciliation of Ethical Rationalism, Ethical Naturalism, Virtue Ethics, and the Biological and Social Sciences					9
2.1.1.	Reasserting the Compatibility of the Methodologies of Value Theory and of the Sciences					10
2.1.2.	Reasserting the Compatibility of Virtue Ethics and Deontological Rationalism					24
2.2.	The Failure of Axiological Anti-foundationalism					29
2.2.1.	The Ideological Dangers of Anti-foundationalism					29
2.2.2.	The Problem of Indeterminacy: Amartya Sen's Theory of Justice					32
2.2.3.	Karl-Otto Apel's Rebuttal to the Munchhausen Trilemma and Its Relevance to Value Theory					35
2.3.	The Concept of Rationality: Toward a Universal Model					36
2.3.1.	Concepts, Conceptions, and the Possibility of a Universal Model					37
2.3.2.	"Humaniqueness," Social Cognitive Theory, and a Neuroscientific Account of Judgment					40
2.3.3.	Inadequacies and Limitations of Competing Accounts					45
2.3.4.	The Necessary Methodological Preconditions of Universal Applicability					53
2.3.5.	The Model Explicated and Analyzed					54
2.3.6.	Consequences for a Doctrine of Liberation					61
2.4.	Concluding Remarks					63
3.	Rationality and Dialectical Necessity					65
3.1.	Prescription, Preference, and Dialectical Contingence					65
3.1.1.	A Refutation of Harean Anti-descriptivism					67
3.1.2.	Hare's Dialectical Method					79
3.2.	Developing a Method of Justification					91
3.2.1.	The Problem of a Justificatory Method					91
3.2.2.	Problems in Walton's Model of Justification					93
3.2.3.	The Justificatory Model Explicated and Analyzed					97
3.3.	A Sound Positive Account, Part I: An Analysis of Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism					106
3.3.1.	The Basic Elements of Gewirthian Theory					106
3.3.2.	The Premises and Conclusion Reconstructed and Analyzed					111
3.3.3.	Applications to Animal Ethics and the Principle of Proportionality					114
3.3.4.	Applications to Positive Rights					120
3.3.5.	Applications to Classic Moral Dilemmas, the Principle of Double Effect, and Intention					122
3.3.6.	Position A: Incompleteness and Equal Justifiability					127
3.3.7.	Position B: The Self-Contract					129
3.3.8.	Position C: Double Effect, Contrary Double Effect, and Synthetic Double Effect Derived from the PGC					133
3.3.9.	Conclusion and Synthesis					135
3.4.	A Sound Positive Account, Part II: An Analysis of Habermas's Discourse Ethics					139
3.4.1.	Critical Theory, Interaction, and Communicative Ethics					142
3.4.2.	Habermas, Gewirth, and the Inescapability from the Monological					147
3.4.3.	Clarifying the Mirror Image					150
3.4.4.	Epistemological Uncertainty and Alter-Contradiction: A Reconstruction of the Habermasean Argument					153
3.4.5.	Applications to Moral Dilemmas: The Right to Discourse					155
3.4.6.	Applications to Property Theory					157
3.4.7.	The Baker and the Starving Man					162
3.4.8.	The Right to Discourse, Self-Sacrifice, and the Antique Clock					165
3.4.9.	Historical Arguments for a Reinterpretation of Habermasean Ethics					169
3.4.10.	Concluding Remarks: The Single-Person Problem					172
4.	The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments					175
4.1.	The Dialectical Structure of "Ought" and "Must"					175
4.1.1.	The Harean Account of Imperative, Indicative, and Conditional Statements					175
4.1.2.	Actuality, Subjunctivity, and Conditionality					178
4.1.3.	Implications of Gewirthian Theory for Deontic Meaning					188
4.2.	The Dialectical Structure of Rights and Duties					190
4.2.1.	Relativism and the Correlativity of Rights, Duties, and "Must"					190
4.2.2.	Rights, Duties, and Anachronism					193
4.2.3.	Concluding Remarks					194
5.	Virtue and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness					197
5.1.	Magnell's Challenge					197
5.1.1.	Probing the Predicative-Attributive Distinction					198
5.1.2.	The Definitive Criteria for Value Intrinsicality					200
5.2.	Problems in Searle's Epistemology of Function					202
5.2.1.	The Social Construction of Function					202
5.2.2.	The Problem of Classification in the Absence of Essence					205
5.2.3.	Functions, Mental States, and the Background					209
5.2.4.	Concluding Remarks					210
5.3.	The Life Framework: The Significance of Foot's Virtue Theory					212
5.3.1.	Function, Necessity, and the Grammar of Goodness					213
5.3.2.	The Magnitude of the Implications					216
6.	Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness					221
6.1.	Reflexive Intrinsicality and the Teleologically Comparative Tendential Necessity of Functions					222
6.1.1.	Assaying Some Peculiarities					222
6.1.2.	The Good-for Thesis					223
6.1.3.	The Reflexive Intrinsicality of Goodness					224
6.1.4.	Tendency, Necessity, and Function					226
6.1.5.	Applications to Goodness					232
6.1.6.	A Naturalistic Definition of Goodness					234
6.1.7.	First Proof of Intrinsic Goodness					236
6.1.8.	Second Proof of Intrinsic Goodness					238
6.1.9.	The Universality of Goodness and the Comparison of Goods					240
6.1.10.	Objection to Betterness and Reply					242
6.1.11.	A Naturalistic Definition of Betterness					243
6.1.12.	Objections and Replies					246
6.1.13.	Teleological Comparativeness					248
6.1.14.	Objections and a Reply via the Argument to the Commensurability of Teloi					250
6.1.15.	Comparison and the Telos of Betterness					252
6.1.16.	Another Objection to the Commensurability of Teloi and a Reply					256
6.1.17.	Conceptual Connections to the Non-Descriptivist Fallacy					259
6.1.18.	Objections on Grounds of Inherent Relativity and a Reply					260
6.1.19.	Objection on Grounds of Failure to Prove that Value Is a Natural Property and a Reply					262
6.1.20.	Objection on Grounds of Dialectical Necessity and a Reply					263
6.1.21.	Objection on Grounds of the Intrinsicality-Finality Distinction and a Reply					264
6.1.22.	Final Considerations: The Inadequacy of Summation and Aggregative Models of Value					265
6.2.	The Summum Bonum					267
6.2.1.	From Value to Rationality: The Fundamental Link Elucidated					268
6.2.2.	Justifying a Summum Bonum					272
6.2.3.	Logical Judgment					275
6.2.4.	Conceptual Synthesis					276
6.2.5.	Conceptual Abstraction					278
6.2.6.	Freedom					279
6.2.7.	Wisdom and the Unity of the Virtues					281
6.2.8.	Objections and Reply					282
6.2.9.	The Question of Attainability					284
6.2.10.	Phronesis, Eudaimonia, and Nirvana					287
6.2.11.	The Question of Individual Telos					290
6.2.12.	Some Implications for Aesthetics					291
6.2.13.	The Question of Individual Telos Revisited: The Relevance of Phenomenology					292
6.2.14.	Gewirth and Habermas Revisited					296
6.2.15.	The Single-Person Problem Resolved					298
6.2.16.	The Final Assessment: Choosing a Model					299
6.3.	Conclusion					300
6.3.1.	The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum					300
6.3.2.	Enlightenment and Liberation					302
7.	Conclusion					309
7.1.	The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum					309
7.2.	Enlightenment and Liberation					310
7.3.	Preliminary Implications for Political Theory					313
	Bibliography					319

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Description 1 online resource (xiii, 327 pages) : illustrations Series Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, 1387-6678 ; volume 33 Library of ethics and applied philosophy ; v. 33. 1387-6678 Contents Rethinking Rationality -- Rationality and Dialectical Necessity -- The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments -- Rationality, Virtue, and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness -- Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness Summary This book explores the overlooked but vital theoretical relationships between R.M. Hare, Alan Gewirth, and Jorgen Habermas. The author claims their accounts of value, while failing to address classic virtue-theoretical critiques, bear the seeds of a resolution to the ultimate question "What is most valuable?" These dialectical approaches, as claimed, justify a reinterpretation of value and value judgment according to the Carnapian conception of an empirical-linguistic framework or grammar. Through a further synthesis with the work of Philippa Foot and Thomas Magnell, the author shows that value would be literally meaningless without four fundamental phenomena which constitute such a framework: Logical Judgment, Conceptual Synthesis, Conceptual Abstraction, and Freedom. As part of the 'grammar of goodness, ' the excellence of these phenomena, in a highly concrete way, constitute the essence of the greatest good, as this book explains Bibliography Includes bibliographical references Notes English Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed November 25, 2013) Subject Values. Ethics. Rationalism. ethics (philosophy) rationalism (philosophy) PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy. Droit. Sciences sociales. Sciences humaines. Ethics Rationalism Values Form Electronic book ISBN 9783319022857 3319022857

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