| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
1. "Knowledge" -- 1.1. Contextualism in general -- 1.2. Kaplan on character and content -- 1.3. Modals -- 1.4. "Knows" contextualism and skepticism -- 1.5. Elusive knowledge -- 1.6. Quantifiers -- 1.7. Lewis and Lewisian contextualism -- 1.8. Epistemic standards -- 1.9. Invariantism with shifting standards -- 1.10. Factivity -- 1.11. Modality and knowledge ascriptions -- 1.12. Differences between knowledge and quantifiers -- 1.13. Knowledge embedded in conditionals -- 1.14. Is contextualism ad hoc? -- 2. Sensitivity -- 2.1. Two puzzles -- 2.2. David Lewis on counterfactuals -- 2.3. Counterfactual contextualism -- 2.4. Rules for possibilities -- 2.5. Karen Lewis and ignorance of counterfactuals -- 2.6. Knowledge and sensitivity -- 2.7. Equivocation and necessary conditions -- 2.8. Strengthening the antecedent -- 2.9. Sensitivity, safety, and knowledge -- 3. Evidence -- 3.1. Motivation for E=K -- 3.2. An argument against E=K -- 3.3. Evidence as non-inferential? -- 3.4. Alexander Bird and "Holmesian inference" -- 3.5. Abominable conjunctions -- 3.6. Non-contextualist responses -- 3.7. Contextualist E=K -- 3.8. The intuitions again -- 3.9. Evidence as important -- 3.10. Circularity and basic knowledge -- 3.11. Lewis and Cartesian contextualism -- 3.12. Moorean contextualism -- 3.13. Skeptical intuitions and Moorean contextualism -- 3.14. Radical skepticism -- 4. Justification -- 4.1. Initial clarifications -- 4.2. Desiderata for a theory of justification -- 4.3. J=K? -- 4.4. Justification as potential knowledge -- 4.5. Is JPK internalist? -- 4.6. Contextualism -- 4.7. Steven Reynolds -- 4.8. Alexander Bird -- 4.9. Justification as a normative status -- 4.10. An objection -- 4.11. Lotteries -- 4.12. History -- 4.13. Reliability -- Appendix : impossible knowledge, content externalism, and JPK -- 5. Action -- 5.1. Use of "knows" -- 5.2. Reasons -- 5.3. Contextualism and norms -- 5.4. Intuitive counterexamples to necessity -- 5.5. Intuitive counterexamples to sufficiency -- 5.6. More specific theoretical intuitions -- 5.7. The thought-bubble model of practical reasoning -- 5.8. Counter-closure -- 5.9. Locke on ethical theory -- 5.10. Schroeder on ethical theory -- 5.11. Reason-to -- 5.12. Internalism and external redundancy -- 5.13. An ethical analogy -- 5.14. A challenge to internalist KR -- 5.15. Contextualism and symmetry -- 5.16. Internalism and basic knowledge -- 6. Assertion -- 6.1. Stanley and the certainty norm -- 6.2. The factivity challenge -- 6.3. High-standards assertability of low-standards knowledge -- 6.4. DeRose 2002 -- 6.5. DeRose 2009 -- 6.6. Contextualism and norms, again -- 6.7. The method of cases -- 6.8. KA and good enough positions to assert -- 6.9. Turri's "simple test" -- 6.10. Incremental assertion -- 6.11. Contexts and possibilities -- 6.12. The incremental knowledge norm of assertion -- 6.13. Schaffer on contrastivism and assertion -- 6.14. Explaining Moore-paradoxicality -- 7. Belief -- 7.1. Outright belief -- 7.2. Shifty data -- 7.3. Clarke, sensitivism, and belief as credence one -- 7.4. Challenges for Clarke -- 7.5. Contextualism about belief ascriptions -- 7.6. "Knows" and "believes" -- 7.7. Knowledge and proper belief -- 7.8. Doxastic states and epistemology |
| Summary |
Jonathan Ichikawa synthesizes two prominent ideas in epistemology: contextualism about knowledge ascriptions, and the 'knowledge first' emphasis on the theoretical primacy of knowledge. He argues that in thinking clearly about knowledge, epistemologists must also think about the dynamic aspects of the words we use to talk about knowledge |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Knowledge, Theory of.
|
|
Semantics.
|
|
epistemology.
|
|
semantics.
|
|
PHILOSOPHY -- Epistemology.
|
|
Knowledge, Theory of
|
|
Semantics
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9780191839917 |
|
0191839914 |
|
9780191505171 |
|
019150517X |
|
