| Description |
1 online resource : text file, PDF |
| Series |
Routledge research in comparative politics ; 72 |
|
Routledge research in comparative politics ; 72.
|
| Contents |
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Institutions, partisanship and market perceptions; Market perceptions of the left in developing countries: a lesson from Lula 5; Institutions as a contingent signal of policy predictability; Plan of the book and the findings; Contribution of the book; Conclusions: embracing constraints to build credibility; 2 Sovereign credibility in global financial markets; Financial market integration and market volatility; Political risk in sovereign debt markets: perceived willingness to pay |
|
The brand name effect, negativity bias, and institutionsInstitutions as a contingent signal; Changes in institutional arrangements; Formal versus informal institutions; Assessing sovereign credibility: the role of credit ratings; Conclusions; 3 Leftist party government and perceived creditworthiness; Earlier debates on government partisanship and policy differences; Government partisanship and market perceptions; Empirical findings; Government partisanship and sovereign credibility; Governing party change and sovereign credibility; Conclusions; 4 Democracy and sovereign creditworthiness |
|
"Democratic advantage" and sovereign credibilityCorruption, transparency, and democracy; Illiberal democracy, deliberative democracy, and sovereign credibility; Left-winggovernments, populism, and democracy; Institutional changes and perceived creditworthiness; Earlier findings on democracy, investment, and sovereign credibility; Quantitative and qualitative evidence; Effects of democracy on sovereign credibility; Government transparency and sovereign credibility; Institutional changes and creditworthiness; Cases: Venezuela under Chávez and Peru under Fujimori; Conclusions |
|
5 Political constraints and sovereign creditworthinessPolitical constraints and policy changes; Political constraints and sovereign credibility; Quantitative and qualitative evidence; Political constraints and sovereign credit ratings; Political constraints, status quo, and sovereign credibility; Case study: India's United Front versus National Democratic Alliance; Conclusions; 6 The IMF and sovereign creditworthiness; Investor confidence and IMF conditionality; IMF programs and investor confidence: the role of government partisanship; Quantitative and qualitative evidence |
|
Impact of IMF programs on sovereign credibilityEffects of signing a new IMF program on sovereign credibility; Case study: a tale of two Hungaries; Conclusions; 7 Conclusion: partisan politics and credibility in global financial markets; Implications for scholars: conditional effects of institutions on market perceptions; Implications for policymakers: embracing constraints for greater policy autonomy; Appendix 1: Interviews with financial market experts; Appendix 2.1: Data sources and summary statistics; Appendix 2.2: Countries in the sample; Appendix 3: Supplements to Chapter 3 |
| Summary |
"Increasingly integrated global financial markets have been shaken by a series of severe shocks in recent decades, from Mexico's Tequila crisis to the upheavals in the Eurozone. These crises have demonstrated that signs of uncertain local economic and political conditions can result in market fluctuations which in turn cause economic, social, and political instability. Such instability is particularly severe for developing countries that rely heavily on international financial markets for their financial needs. Building credibility in these markets is therefore important for national governments who wish to prevent market panic and capital flight and, ultimately, to achieve stable economic growth. Earlier studies have argued that institutional arrangements that constrain governments and commit them to protecting private property rights and market-friendly policies can send a strong positive signal to the markets about a given country's sovereign credibility. This book argues, however, that the market perception of such credibility-building institutions is significantly contingent on which party governs the country. Formal institutions confer significant credibility-building effects on left-wing governments, whereas less or no significant effects are enjoyed by right-wing governments. And beyond that, any significant changes in a country's institutional landscape--such as a breakdown of democracy or joining an international organization that can influence domestic politics--have particularly strong impact on the credibility of left-wing governments. This argument is supported by a quantitative analysis of sovereign credit ratings data collected from around 90 developing countries from 1980 to 2007, by case studies from South Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, and by face-to-face interviews with 24 financial market experts based in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Paris."--Provided by publisher |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
International finance.
|
|
Banks and banking.
|
|
Capital market.
|
|
POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Public Policy -- Economic Policy.
|
|
SOCIAL SCIENCE -- Ethnic Studies -- General.
|
|
Banks and banking
|
|
Capital market
|
|
International finance
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9781315445045 |
|
1315445042 |
|
9781315445038 |
|
1315445034 |
|
