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Author Campbell, Catherine Galko, author

Title Persons, identity, and political theory : a defense of Rawlsian political identity / Catherine Galko Campbell
Published Dordrecht : Springer, 2014
Table of Contents
1.Political Identity, Perfectionism, and Neutrality1
 Introduction1
 Perfectionism, Neutrality, and the Aims of Government4
 Personal Identity and Political Identity10
 Overview of the Structure of the Book11
 References13
2.Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory15
 Introduction to Communitarian Objections to Liberal Political Theory15
 Liberal Theory and Individualism19
 Metaphysical Individualism20
 Normative Individualism21
 Liberals, Communitarians, and Individualism21
 Communitarian Objections to Rawls28
 Objections to the Original Position28
 Objections to the Political Conception of the Person31
 Priority of the Right and Objections to the Political Conception of the Person34
 References36
3.Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Conception of the Person39
 Taylor on the Liberal/Communitarian Debate39
 Priority of the Right over the Good and Unencumbered Selves43
 Objections to Normative Individualism50
 Conclusion55
 References56
4.Taylor's Conception of Persons and His Theory of Personal Identity57
 Introduction57
 Taylor's Objection to Atomistic Conceptions of Persons58
 Taylor's Conception of Persons63
 Taylor on Language and Persons' Identities66
 Frameworks and Strong Evaluation69
 Taylor's Conception of Personal Identity72
 Conclusion78
 References78
5.Defense of the Original Position81
 Two Purposes of the Original Position81
 Intermediate Goal: Support for C82
 Ultimate Goal: Connecting C with Justice83
 Argument Interpretation of the Original Position85
 Evidence in Favor of the Argument Interpretation86
 Argument Interpretation87
 Translation of the Conditions of the Original Position88
 Sample Argument92
 Two Possible Objections to the Argument Interpretation and Responses93
 Refutation of the Objections to the Original Position94
 Identity Objection95
 Personhood Objection96
 From Metaphysical to Normative Identity98
 References102
6.Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of Persons103
 Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person104
 Normative Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person111
 Objection on the Grounds of Valuing the Capacity for Choice112
 Citizenship Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person114
 Empirical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person120
 Conclusion124
 References125
7.Defense of Rawls's Political Conception of the Person127
 Metaphysical Commitments and Rawls's Political Conception of the Person127
 Rawls's Political Conception of the Person Versus Nonpublic or Moral Identity131
 Details of Rawls's Political Conception of the Person133
 Responses to Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person140
 Response to Normative Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person145
 Response to the Objection on the Grounds of Valuing the Capacity for Choice145
 Response to Citizenship Objections148
 Response to Empirical Objections152
 Conclusion156
 References156
8.Rawlsian Political Identity159
 Why does Political Identity Matter?160
 Schechtman on Personal Identity161
 The Reidentification Question161
 The Characterization Question162
 The Characteristics that Matter for Political Identity164
 The Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity166
 Why Rawlsian Political Identity?166
 The Details of the Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity167
 Assessing and Modifying the Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity172
 Perfectionism and Rawlsian Political Identity176
 Conclusion183
 References184
 Index185
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Description 1 online resource (xi, 187 pages)
Contents Political Identity, Perfectionism and Neutrality -- Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory -- Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Conception of the Person -- Taylor's Conception of Persons and His Theory of Personal Identity -- Defense of the Original Position -- Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of Persons -- Defense of Rawls's Political Conception of the Person -- Rawlsian Political Identity
Summary This book examines the conception of the person at work in John Rawls's writings from Theory of Justice to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The book aims to show that objections to Rawls's political conception of the person fail and that a Rawlsian conception of political identity is defensible. The book shows that the debate between liberals and communitarians is relevant to the current debate regarding perfectionism and neutrality in politics, and clarifies the debate between Rawls and communitarians in a way that will promote fruitful discussion on the issue of political identity. It does this by providing a clearer account of a conception of personal identity according to which persons are socially constituted, including the intuitions and assumptions underlying the communitarians conception of persons as socially constituted. It examines the communitarian objections to liberal political theory and to the liberal conception of persons, the unencumbered self. The book differentiates between two types of objection to the liberal conception of persons: the metaphysical and normative. It explains Rawls's political conception of persons, and the metaphysical and normative commitments Rawls incurs and does not incur in virtue of that conception. It shows that both kind of objection to Rawls's political conception of the person fail. Finally, modifying Rawls's political conception of the person, a Rawlsian conception of political identity is explained and defended
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed November 25, 2013)
Subject Identity politics.
Identity (Philosophical concept)
Form Electronic book
ISBN 940077916X
9400779178 (electronic bk.)
9789400779167
9789400779174 (electronic bk.)