| Description |
1 online resource (304 pages) : color illustrations |
| Contents |
Acknowledgements -- 1. The Scope and Aims of This Book: Properties, Laws, and Dispositions -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism -- 1.2.1 Properties and Predicates -- 1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions -- 1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization -- 1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding -- 1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship -- 1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction -- 1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity -- 1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence -- 1.2.9 The Methodology of Ground Theorizing -- 1.3 The Rival Approaches to Natural Modality -- 1.3.1 The Mosaic View -- 1.3.2 The Law-Driven Account -- 1.3.3 Property-Driven Approaches to Natural Modality -- 1.4 Modal Platonism in More Detail -- 1.4.1 Defending Platonism -- 1.4.2 The Grounding Theory of Natural Modality -- 1.5 The Big Picture -- PART I. THE CORE THEORY: MODAL PLATONISM -- 2. The Platonic Theory of Dispositional Directedness -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Two Metaphysical Principles about Dispositions -- 2.3 Properties as Tropes or Universals? -- 2.4 The Aristotelian versus Platonic View of Universals -- 2.5 Alternative Accounts of Dispositional Directedness -- 2.5.1 Manifestations as Parts: The Conjunctive Property Proposal -- 2.5.2 Manifestations as Structural Constituents: The Diachronic Property Proposal -- 2.5.3 Directedness as a Higher-Order Monadic Property -- 2.6 Conclusions -- 3. Against Dispositional Essentialism: A Grounding Theory of Natural Modality -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Two Kinds of Internal Relation -- 3.3 Against the Bradlean Conception of Dispositional Directedness -- 3.4 Jaag's Formulation of the Problem Facing Dispositional Essentialism -- 3.5 The Leibnizian Approach: Universals as Qualities Which Ground Natural Modality -- 3.6 The Logical Form of Dispositional Predication -- 3.7 Comparison with Other Theories of Dispositions -- 3.8 Conclusions -- 4. Solving the Entailment and Governance Problems -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Entailment Problem -- 4.3 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Not Entail -- 4.4 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Entail -- 4.5 Does the Reverse Entailment Hold? -- 4.6 The Question of Governance -- 4.7 Why Leibnizian Relations of Directedness Do Not Govern -- 5. Dissolving the Problem of Latent Dispositions -- 5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Latent Dispositions -- 5.2 Mumford's and Bird's Dispositionalist Accounts of Latent Dispositions -- 5.3 Identity Theory to the Rescue? -- 5.4 Psillos's Regress Problem -- 5.5 Marmodoro's Pure Powers Response -- 5.6 Bauer's Pure Powers Response -- 5.7 Conclusions -- 6. Objections and Replies |
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6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Really Realist? -- 6.3 Multiple Realization? -- 6.4 Act of Faith? -- 6.5 Humean? -- 6.6 Can Qualities Explain Dispositions? -- 6.7 Meta-Grounding? -- 6.8 Exclusion Problem? -- 6.9 Qualities Collapse into Powers? -- 6.10 Why Not Tropes? -- 6.11 What Is Directedness? -- 6.12 Not Naturalistic? -- 6.13 Un-Eleatic? -- 7. Instantiation and Repeatability: A Platonic Approach -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Explanatory Instability of Aristotelianism -- 7.3 The Explanatory Role of Platonic Universals: A Traditional View of Instantiation -- 7.4 Is There a Simpler Explanation? -- 7.5 Armstrong's Aristotelian Account of Instantiation and One over Many -- 7.6 Conclusions -- 8. Probabilistic Laws -- 8.1 Introduction: Laws and Probabilistic Strength -- 8.2 Armstrong on Irreducible Probabilistic Laws -- 8.3 Resisting Probabilistic Causation -- 8.4 Armstrong's Preferred Account -- 8.5 The Problem of Probabilistic Failures -- 8.6 The Merits of Modal Platonism -- 8.7 Further Considerations: Van Fraassen's Criticisms of Armstrong's Probabilistic Laws -- 8.8 Conclusions -- 9. Determinable Laws -- 9.1 Introduction: The Challenge of Accounting for Functional Laws -- 9.2 The Problem of Functional Laws in More Detail -- 9.3 Determinable Laws -- 9.4 The Overdetermination Problem -- 9.5 Solving the Overdetermination Problem -- 9.6 Conclusions -- 10. Extending Modal Platonism -- 10.1 Introduction: Modality in General -- 10.2 Non-Natural Modality -- 10.3 Possibility and Necessity: Platonism versus the Dominant Possible-Worlds Approach -- 10.4 The Richness of Modal Platonism -- 10.5 Platonic Modal Relations -- 10.6 Modal Platonism and the Argument from Unrealized Possibility -- 10.7 Alien Possibility and Natural Science -- 10.8 Further Work -- 10.9 Conclusions -- 11. Summary -- Appendix I: Logical Proofs of Chapter 4 -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Concepts |
| Summary |
This philosophical work is about the metaphysical preconditions of natural science. It develops and defends a new metaphysical theory of natural modality called 'Modal Platonism', which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties-such as mass and charge-are ontologically fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the dispositions of things. The theory differs from other 'properties-first' approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory, it is argued, solves a range of puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that natural modality is a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Description based on online resource; title from home page (Oxford Academic, viewed August 10, 2023) |
| Subject |
Modality (Theory of knowledge)
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Metaphysics.
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Metaphysics -- Methodology
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Ontology.
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Science -- Philosophy.
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Physical sciences -- Philosophy
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Philosophy.
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metaphysics.
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ontology (metaphysics)
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philosophy.
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Metaphysics
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Metaphysics -- Methodology
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Modality (Theory of knowledge)
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Ontology
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Philosophy
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Physical sciences -- Philosophy
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Science -- Philosophy
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191889042 |
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0191889040 |
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