| Description |
1 online resource (xiii, 163 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
| Contents |
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1 The Underinclusive Concept of Oversight -- 2 Broadening the Conception of Legislative Power -- 3 The Punctuated Nature of Congressional Delegation and the Investigative State -- 4 Delegating Oversight: Fire Chiefs and Oversight Efficiency -- 2 The American Political History and Jurisprudence Behind Congressional Delegation of the Investigative Power -- 1 The Legislative Power to Investigate and Its Delegation to the Executive Branch -- 1.1 The Legislative Power to Investigate |
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The Congressional Power to Investigate Political Officials -- The Congressional Power to Investigate the Private Sphere -- 1.2 Delegation Beyond Rules -- Congress Has Delegated to the Bureaucracy the Legislative Power to Investigate the Private Sector -- Congressional Delegation of the Legislative Power to Make Rules over the Private Sector Presumes a Prior Delegation of the Legislative Power to Investigate -- Congress Delegates' Political Monitoring of Administration Appointees by Creating Bureaucratic Oversight Officials -- 2 The Legal Dynamics of Political Oversight |
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2.1 The Supreme Court's Recognition of Bureaucratic Investigations as Legislative, Not Executive, Powers -- 2.2 Congressional Oversight of the Bureaucracy as an Implied Power Arising from Delegation -- 2.3 The Institutional Response to the Legislative Bureaucracy: Unitary Executive Theory, Nondelegation Doctrine, and "Accommodation" -- 3 Congressional Delegation of Its Power to Monitor Policy Implementation -- 1 The Law of Delegation and the Politics of Oversight -- 2 Effects of Investigative Delegations on Congressional Oversight |
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2.1 Motivations to Delegate: Maximal Electoral Rewards for Minimum Work -- 2.2 Administrative Procedures Serve a Monitoring Function by Attaching Requirements to Delegation That Maximize Electoral Preferences -- Administrative Subpoenas Issued by the Bureaucracy over the Private Sector Would Be Expected to Reduce Oversight Workload -- The Paired Strategies of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Legislative Reorganization Act: Committee Oversight Structure to Reward Agenda-Setting -- 4 The Politics of Overseeing the Administrative State |
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1 Punctuated Delegation: The Political Development of the Administrative State -- 2 Ideological Motivations for Oversight, Electoral Explanations for Its Delegation -- 3 Political Control over Delegation Through the Electoral Connection -- 4 Congressional Oversight in Decline or Optimally Efficient? -- 4.1 Bureaucratic Investigations as Legislative -- 4.2 Bureaucratic Investigations as Law Enforcement -- 5 An Empirical Model of Delegation and Oversight -- 6 Results -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- Appendix A: Measuring Oversight |
| Summary |
This book should be read by anyone who is interested in the way in which the administrative state functions in the U.S. Dr. Epstein develops and explains two important points. First, that congressional oversight should be considered part of the administrative process. Second, that congressional oversight should be viewed broadly to include oversight that has been authorized by Congress in addition to congressional hearings, e.g., oversight by agency inspector generals and oversight by the public and the press through use of the Freedom of Information Act. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University, USA. This book is a timely examination of congressional oversight in the United States, serving as a definitive guide for scholars and political, legal, and media observers seeking to navigate contemporary conflicts between Congress and the White House. Author Daniel Epstein has spent his professional career as a lawyer serving all sides of the regulatory process: he ran investigations for Congress, defended the White House from congressional oversight, and represented individuals, nonprofit news organizations, and entrepreneurs in federal court to fight for regulatory transparency and fairness. Epstein uses historical and observational data to argue that the modern federal bureaucracy did not begin as a regulatory state but as an investigative state. The contemporary picture of Congress having empowered the bureaucracy to set policy through rules is a relatively recent development in the political development of administrative law. The books novel econometric models and historical analyses force a shift in how legal scholars and judges understand delegation, congressional oversight, and agency investigations. Daniel Epstein is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Thomas University in Miami and Director of Trust Ventures LP, USA |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed August 4, 2023) |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Legislative oversight -- United States.
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Legislative oversight.
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United States.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9783031384615 |
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303138461X |
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