| Description |
1 online resource (xii, 412 pages) |
| Contents |
Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: Meaning -- I. Utilitarian Accounts: State of Mind or State of the World? -- 1. Mental state accounts -- 2. Sidgwick's compromise -- 3. The actual-desire account -- 4. The informed-desire account -- 5. Troubles with the informed-desire account -- 6. Is there something between mental state and desire accounts? -- II. Utilitarian Accounts: The Desire Account Developed -- 1. How may we restrict the desire account? -- 2. Why we should resist restricting it more -- 3. How value and desire are related -- 4. A formal account |
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5. Maximization and the unity of life -- 6. A (restricted) interest theory of value -- 7. Is this account still utilitarian? -- III. Objective Accounts -- 1. Two concepts of well-being -- 2. The need account -- 3. Can we give a tolerably clear sense to 'basic need'? -- 4. The link between need and obligation -- 5. Avoiding distortions to moral thought -- 6. A flexible need account -- 7. Neutrality, objectivity, and moral depth -- IV. Perfectionism and the Ends of Life -- 1. Prudential perfectionism -- 2. Moral perfectionism -- 3. The ends of life -- 4. How morality fits into prudence |
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5. What is the good point buried in perfectionism? -- 6. The primacy of prudential value theory -- Part Two: Measurement -- V. Are There Incommensurable Values? -- 1. On measuring well-being -- 2. Moral incommensurables and prudential incommensurables -- 3. Forms of incommensurability: (a) Incomparability -- 4. (b) Trumping -- 5. (c) Weighting -- 6. (d) Discontinuity -- 7. (e) Pluralism -- VI. The Case of One person -- 1. Is well-being the sort of thing that can be measured at all? -- 2. An ordinal scale of well-being -- 3. Pockets of cardinality |
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4. What powers of measurement do we actually need? -- VII. The Case of Many Persons -- 1. The link between conceptions of well-being and problems of comparability -- 2. A natural proposal for comparability and a problem with it -- 3. Can the problem be solved? -- 4. Interpersonal comparisons of well-being -- 5. Intrapersonal intertemporal comparisons -- 6. Comparability on a social scale -- Part Three: Moral Importance -- VIII. From Prudence to Morality -- 1. Morality as something alien -- 2. (a) Morality and self-interest -- 3. (b) Morality and personal aims -- 4. (c) Morality and rationality |
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5. The nature of the self and the source of morality -- IX. Equal Respect -- 1. Equal respect and psychological realism -- 2. The utilitarian view of equal respect -- 3. The contractualist view of equal respect -- 4. The two views compared -- 5. A view of equal respect that allows some partiality -- X. Fairness -- 1. Two problems: fairness and the breadth of the moral outlook -- 2. The consequentialist's problem of .nding a broad enough outlook -- 3. The free-rider problem and a minimal solution -- 4. The possibility of tougher, Kantian solutions -- 5. The solution of an agent-centred deontology |
| Summary |
Offers answers to three central questions about well-being: the best way to understand it; whether it can be measured; and where it should fit in moral and political thought |
| Analysis |
Man Well-being Ethical aspects |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 391-402) and index |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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Print version record |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
| Subject |
Ethics.
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Health.
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Philosophy.
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Health
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Health -- philosophy
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Ethics
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Philosophy
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ethics (philosophy)
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health.
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philosophy.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Social.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
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Philosophy
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Health
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Ethics
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Welzijn.
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Meetmethoden.
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Ethiek.
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Qualité de la vie.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191520068 |
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0191520063 |
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9780191597558 |
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0191597554 |
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