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E-book

Title Deontic modality / edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman
Edition First edition
Published Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016

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Description 1 online resource (434 pages)
Contents Cover; Deontic Modality; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; References; 1: Deontic Modals and Probabilities: One Theory to Rule Them All?; Introduction; 1 Deontic and probabilistic talk; 1.1 Probabilistic Deontic Conditionals; 1.2 Information Sensitivity and Probabilistic Structure; 1.3 Taking Stock; 2 Expected value accounts; 2.1 Spelling out the Expected Value Accounts; 2.2 Against Expected Value Accounts; Attitudes of non-bayesian agents; Disagreement about decision rules; Zero-probability events and decision problems; 2.3 Section Summary
3 Probabilistic premise semantics: a first pass3.1 Formal Preliminaries; 3.2 A Classical Setup; 3.3 Three Unorthodox Ideas; 3.4 The Semantics; 3.5 Applying the Semantics; 3.6 First PassWrap-up; 4 Probabilistic premise semantics: second pass; 5 Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; 2: Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!; 1 Introduction; 2 The Standard Semantics; 3 Refinement; 3.1 Strong and weak DNMs; 4 Un certainty; 4.1 MaxiMax; 4.2 Decision-theoretic quietism; 4.3 Applying decision-theoretic quietism: the miners; 4.4 Decision theory and truth-conditions; 4.5 Rational fetishists
5 PackingIt In5.1 Disagreement; 5.2 Binding; 5.3 Parametrization; 5.4 Competing truth-conditions; 6 Metasemantics; 6.1 Against propositions; 6.2 Modeling competent judgment; 6.3 Expressivism; 6.4 Minimalism; References; 3: Linguistic and Philosophical Considerations on Bayesian Semantics; 1 Empirical and Theoretical Motivation for Bayesian Semantics; 2 "Controversial Normative Assumptions" and Binding; 3 Causal and Evidential Expected Value; 4 Variation in Judgments and (Conceivable) Disagreement; 4.1 Non-consequentialist Judgments; 4.2 Conceivability Arguments and Other Disagreements
5 FurtherObjections5.1 Attitudes; 5.2 Dominance Reasoning and Zero-probability Events; 6 Conclusion; References; 4: Contextualism about Deontic Conditionals; 1 Kratzer-Style Contextualism; 2 Miner Variations; 2.1 The MINERS objection; 2.2 Deliberative readings: subjective and advisability; 2.3 Kratzer-friendly readings for miner variations; 2.4 Three-shaft version of MINERS; 3 Self-Frustrating Decisions; 4 Objections: Assessing Semantic versus Near-side Pragmatic Explanations; 5 Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; 5: Objective and Subjective 'Ought'; 1 A Semantic Framework
2 The Varieties of 'Ought'3 The Expectational Schema; 4 Instances of the Expectational Schema; 5 'Ought' and Conditionals; 6 Objections and Replies; Acknowledgments; References; 6: 'Ought': Out of Order; 1 Ordering Semantics: Dyadic to Polyadic; 2 Instrumental Conditionals; 3 TheSourceofNormativity; 4 Gradability and "Weak Necessity"; 5 Information-sensitivity; 6 Conflicts; 7 Metasemantic Issues; 8 Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; 7: On a Shared Property of Deonticand Epistemic Modals; 1 Introduction; 2 A Semantics for Deontic and Epistemic Must
Summary This volume presents new work on the much-discussed topic of deontic modality: the meaning and function of language relating to what is allowed, required, or obligatory, in view of moral or legal demands. A team of leading experts in philosophy of language, meta-ethics, and linguistics tackle key issues at the heart of the debate
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes Print version record
Subject Language and languages -- Philosophy.
LANGUAGE ARTS & DISCIPLINES -- General.
Language and languages -- Philosophy
Form Electronic book
Author Charlow, Nate, 1984- editor.
Chrisman, Matthew, editor.
ISBN 9780191787393
0191787396
9780191027765
0191027766
019871792X
9780198717928