| Description |
xi, 110 pages ; 22 cm |
| Contents |
1. A first look at freedom -- 2. Why freedom seems impossible -- 3. Is compatibilism believable? -- 4. Why the case for determinism fails -- 5. Fatalism, and truth about the future -- 6. Two faces of time -- 7. Causality, time, and agency -- 8. Becoming, freedom, and the problem of evil -- 9. Your freedom and you |
| Summary |
"Written for general readers and students, this book provides an accessible and brief metaphysical defense of freedom. James W. Felt, S.J., invites his audience to consider that we are responsible for what we do precisely because we do it freely. His perspective runs counter to the philosophers who argue that the freedom humans feel in their actions is merely an illusion. Felt argues in detail that there are no compelling reasons for thinking we are not free, and very strong ones for thinking that we are. The view that Felt develops parallels that of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941). In the course of his analysis, Felt considers determinism, compatibilism, agency, and the problem of evil. Featuring an updated list of suggested readings, this clearly and engagingly written introductory work is ideal for the undergraduate classroom."--BOOK JACKET |
| Notes |
Originally published: Ithaca [N.Y.] : Cornell University Press, 1994 |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [105]-107) and index |
| Subject |
Free will and determinism.
|
|
Agent (Philosophy)
|
| LC no. |
2004026940 |
| ISBN |
026802877X alkaline paper |
|
