| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 262 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover -- Trade Policy in Multilevel Government: Organizing Openness -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- 1: Introduction: The Rise of Multilevel Trade Governance -- Theoretical Argument and Contribution -- The Case of Procurement Liberalization -- Findings -- Book Outline -- 2: More Voice, Less Exit: The Dynamics of Multilevel Trade Governance -- 2.1 Federalism, Multilevel Government, and the European Union -- 2.2 The Dynamic Nature of Multilevel Government -- 2.3 Voice and Exit in Multilevel Trade Governance |
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The Inverse Relationship between Constituent Units' Voice and Exit -- Voice in Different Varieties of Multilevel Government -- Voice in the Council and Senate Varieties of Multilevel Government -- Voice in Collaborative and Competitive Vertical Relations -- Market Integration and Politicization as Intervening Factors -- 2.4 Case Selection -- 2.5 Method of Comparison and Empirical Data Base -- Summary -- 3: Resisting Openness: Subcentral Governments and Procurement Liberalization -- 3.1 The Significance of Public Procurement in Multilevel Government |
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3.2 The Emergence of an International Regime on Public Procurement -- The Procurement Regime's Historical Foundations -- The Regime's Continuous Entrenchment in Recent Decades -- 3.3 Varying Subcentral Openness to Multilevel Procurement Liberalization -- Comparatively Low Openness in the United States -- 1946-88: Pursuing the Creation of an International Regime -- 1989-95: Expanding GPA Coverage to States -- 1996-2017: States' Ebbing Desire for Procurement Liberalization -- 1964-2009: Provincial Resistance to the Plurilateral Regime -- 2010-17: Canada as a Driver of Procurement Liberalization |
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Comparatively High Openness in the European Union -- 1964-85: Cautious Position during the Tokyo Round -- 1986-95: Offensive Stance during the Uruguay Round -- 1996-2017: Expanding Disciplines in and Beyond the GPA -- Summary -- 4: United States: The Limits of Self-Rule -- 4.1 The US Senate Model in Trade Governance -- Federal and State Powers in Trade Policy -- The Market Participant Exception and Pre-Emption -- Implicit Pre-Emption: The Irrevocability of State Commitments -- The States' Role in Trade Policy-Making -- The USTR's Voluntary Opt-In Mechanism in Procurement |
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4.2 Sectoral Competition between the States and Washington -- 'Coercive Cooperation' in the US Federation -- Vertical Relations on Trade and Procurement Policy -- Dysfunctional Vertical Coordination in IGPAC -- Distrust between the States and Washington -- 4.3 Fragmentation in the Domestic Market -- 4.4 Episodes of Subcentral Politicization -- Summary -- 5: Canada: Less Centralization, More Integration -- 5.1 The Canadian Senate Model in Trade Governance -- Federal and Provincial Powers in Trade Policy -- Evolving Jurisdiction and the Provincial 'Right to Intervene' |
| Summary |
This book investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. It tests its theory's explanatory power on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
The Role of Central-Level Actors in Trade Policy-Making |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Commercial policy.
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International trade.
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Trade regulation.
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Industrial policy.
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Federal government.
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Federal government
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Commercial policy
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Industrial policy
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International trade
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Trade regulation
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780192598165 |
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0192598163 |
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9780192598172 |
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0192598171 |
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9780191889615 |
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019188961X |
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