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E-book
Author Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I

Title Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision / Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Published Wiesbaden : Gabler, 2019

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Description 1 online resource (217 pages)
Series Edition KWV Ser
Edition KWV Ser
Contents Intro; Acknowledgements; Contents; 1 Introduction; Part I Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Theoretical Studies; 2 Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The model; 2.3 Quantity contracts and investments; 2.3.1 Only the manager has investment tasks; 2.3.2 Only the government has investment tasks; 2.3.3 Both parties have investment tasks; 2.4 Optimal governance structures; 2.5 Concluding remarks; 2.6 Appendix
3 Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The model; 3.3 Public-private partnership; 3.3.1 No innovation at date 2 (x = 0); 3.3.2 An innovation at date 2 (x = 1); 3.3.3 The effort decision at date 1; 3.4 Traditional procurement; 3.5 Public-private partnership versus traditional procurement; 3.6 Concluding remarks; 3.7 Appendix; 4 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The model; 4.3 Scenario I; 4.4 Scenario II
4.5 Comparison of the scenariosPart II Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Experimental Evidence; 5 Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Can contracts solve the hold-up problem?; 5.2.1 Experimental design; 5.2.2 Predictions; 5.2.3 Results; 5.3 Contracts as reference points; 5.3.1 Experimental design and predictions; 5.3.2 Results; 5.4 Concluding remarks; 5.5 Appendix; 6 Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The model; 6.3 Experimental design; 6.4 Qualitative hypotheses
6.5 Data analysis6.5.1 Experimental results; 6.5.2 Individual wage offers and resulting efforts; 6.6 Discussion; 6.7 Concluding remarks; 6.8 Appendix; 7 Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Experimental design; 7.3 Cognitive reflection test; 7.4 Results; 7.4.1 Base rate fallacy; 7.4.2 Conservatism bias; 7.4.3 Overweighting and underweighting of base rates; 7.4.4 Overconfidence; 7.4.5 Endowment effect; References
Summary Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I
Notes Print version record
Subject Contracts.
Contracts -- Economic aspects
Contracts
contracts.
Contracts
Contracts -- Economic aspects
Genre/Form contracts.
Contracts
Contracts.
Contrats.
Form Electronic book
ISBN 9783658241339
3658241330