| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
1. Austin's Critical Method -- I. Skeptical Argument -- II. Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument -- III. Austin's Way with the Argument -- IV. Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided -- V. Austin Misread -- VI. Austin's Actual Brief -- VII. Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals -- VIII. "Snag of Divergent Usage" -- IX. Problem of Pragmatics -- X. Appeal to Philosophical Detachment -- XI. Appeal to Intuitions -- XII. Two Kinds of Freedom to Theorize -- XIII. Work Left to Do -- 2. Austin as Theorist -- I. Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher -- II. Austin on the Nature of Knowledge -- III. If You Know, You Can t Be Wrong -- IV. Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge -- V. Special Reasons -- VI. Charge of Over-Intellectualization -- VII. Missing "in Virtue" Account -- VIII. Argument from Ignorance -- 3. Philosophical Detachment Revisited -- I. Looking for a Route between the Horns -- II. Plane-Spotters -- III. Understanding Human Knowledge in General -- IV. Nature of Experience -- V. Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a Subject -- VI. Tug of the Dream Argument -- VII. Pragmatics Revisited -- VIII. More Ecumenical Attempt -- IX. Challenge that Remains -- 4. How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface -- I. Requirement of Deductive Cogency -- II. Confidence Threshold Requirement -- III. Why the Threshold Requirement Can t Be Correct, Part I -- IV. Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II -- V. Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved -- VI. Preface: Saying It's All True -- VII. Preface: A Matter of Modesty -- VIII. Preface: Saying the Improbable -- IX. Worry about Downstream Consequences -- X. Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I -- XI. Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II -- XII. Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility -- 5. How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge -- I. Is it Important to Decide What You Know? -- II. Knowledge and Evidence -- III. Justified Belief and Evidence -- IV. Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence -- V. Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence -- VI. Methodological Import of Gettier's Case -- VII. Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier's -- VIII. Moral about Experimental Epistemology -- IX. Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis -- 6. Epistemology Austin's Way |
| Summary |
In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J.L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Austin, J. L. (John Langshaw), 1911-1960 -- Criticism and interpretation
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| SUBJECT |
Austin, J. L. (John Langshaw), 1911-1960. fast (OCoLC)fst00029792 |
| Subject |
Knowledge, Theory of.
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epistemology.
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PHILOSOPHY -- History & Surveys -- Modern.
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Knowledge, Theory of.
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| Genre/Form |
Criticism, interpretation, etc.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780192558312 |
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0192558315 |
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9780191863530 |
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019186353X |
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