| Description |
xii, 348 pages ; 25 cm |
| Contents |
1. The main ideas I -- 2. The main ideas II -- 3. The second-person stance and second-personal reasons -- 4. Accountability and the second person -- 5. Moral obligation and accountability -- 6. Respect and the second person -- 7. The psychology of the second person -- 8. Interlude : Reid versus Hume on justice (withcontemporary resonances) -- 9. Morality and autonomy in Kant -- 10. Dignity and the second person : variations on Fichtean themes -- 11. Freedom and practical reason -- 12. A foundation for contractualism |
| Summary |
"Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner - along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue - result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject - falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations - Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations : their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community."--BOOK JACKET |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 323-340) and index |
| Subject |
Ethics.
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Authority.
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Responsibility.
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Respect for persons.
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| LC no. |
2006041229 |
| ISBN |
9780674022744 hardback |
|
0674022742 hardback |
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