Title Organizations at war in Afghanistan and beyond / Abdulkader H. Sinno

Published Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2008

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Description 1 online resource (xiii, 336 pages) : illustrations, maps Contents Organizing to win -- Organization and the outcome of conflicts -- Advantages and limitations of structures -- The gist of the organizational theory -- The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan -- Resilience through division, 1979-1989 -- The cost of the failure to restructure, 1989-1994 -- The rise of the Taliban, 1994-2001 -- Afghan conflicts under U.S. occupation, 2001 -- The organizational theory beyond Afghanistan Summary While popular accounts of warfare, particularly of nontraditional conflicts such as guerrilla wars and insurgencies, favor the roles of leaders or ideology, social-scientific analyses of these wars focus on aggregate categories such as ethnic groups, religious affiliations, socioeconomic classes, or civilizations. Challenging these constructions, Abdulkader H. Sinno closely examines the fortunes of the various factions in Afghanistan, including the mujahideen and the Taliban, that have been fighting each other and foreign armies since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Focusing on the organization of the combatants, Sinno offers a new understanding of the course and outcome of such conflicts. Employing a wide range of sources, including his own fieldwork in Afghanistan and statistical data on conflicts across the region, Sinno contends that in Afghanistan, the groups that have outperformed and outlasted their opponents have done so because of their successful organization. Each organization's ability to mobilize effectively, execute strategy, coordinate efforts, manage disunity, and process information depends on how well its structure matches its ability to keep its rivals at bay. Centralized organizations, Sinno finds, are generally more effective than noncentralized ones, but noncentralized ones are more resilient absent a safe haven. Sinno's organizational theory explains otherwise puzzling behavior found in group conflicts: the longevity of unpopular regimes, the demise of popular movements, and efforts of those who share a common cause to undermine their ideological or ethnic kin. The author argues that the organizational theory applies not only to Afghanistan-where he doubts the effectiveness of American state-building efforts-but also to other ethnic, revolutionary, independence, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL English digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Print version record Subject Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) -- Afghanistan Organizational behavior -- Afghanistan Intergroup relations -- Afghanistan POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Security (National & International) HISTORY -- Asia -- Central Asia. HISTORY -- Asia -- General. Intergroup relations Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) Organizational behavior Oorlogen. Oorlogvoering. Organisatiestructuur. SUBJECT Afghanistan -- History -- Soviet occupation, 1979-1989. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85001522 Afghanistan -- History -- 1989-2001. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002317 Afghanistan -- History -- 2001-2021 Subject Afghanistan Afghanistan. Genre/Form History Form Electronic book ISBN 9780801459306 0801459303

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