| Description |
1 online resource (324 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications |
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Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index |
| Summary |
How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolve |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Debts, External -- History
|
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Debtor and creditor -- History
|
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Public Finance.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Economy.
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Debtor and creditor
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Debts, External
|
| Genre/Form |
History
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9781400842926 |
|
1400842921 |
|
1283379945 |
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9781283379946 |
|
