Cold War deterrence theory and practice -- Why the Cold War deterrence framework is inadequate -- Cold War deterrence thought in the post-Cold War world -- The dilemma of popular usage and a new direction -- Testing the deterrence framework -- The new deterrence framework, evidence, and misplaced confidence -- Lessons of this case study
Summary
In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably wh
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
English
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