1. Introduction -- I. Why? (The positive political economy reform) ; 2. The political economy of delayed reform ; 3. Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presance of individual-specific uncertainty ; 4. Why are stablizations delayed? ; 5. Fiscal conservatism as a response to the debt crisis ; 6. The benefit of crises for economic reform ; 7. Recurrent high inflation and stablization: A dynamic game ; 8. The common property approach to the political economy of fiscal policy ; 9. Fiscal discipline in a union ; 10. The rush to free trade in the developing world: Why so late? Why now? Will it last? -- II. How? (Strategies for reformers) ; 11. The design of reform packages under uncertainty ; 12. Gradualism versus big-bang: Speed and sustainability of reforms ; 13. Sequencing of economic reforms in the presence of political constraints -- III. Who? (The identity of reformers) ; 14. Promises, promises: Credible policy reform via signalling ; 15. Credibility of policymakers and of economic reforms ; 16. The feasibility of low inflation: Theory with an application to the Argentine case -- Index
Summary
"In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and eastern European countries." "The book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take place? Second, how are reforms implemented? And third, which candidates are most likely to undertake reform? Although most of the chapters deal with policy issues in developing economies, the findings also apply to areas such as social security and health care reform in industrialized countries." --Provided by publisher--
