Description |
1 online resource (vii, 396 pages) |
Series |
Routledge studies in epistemology ; 2 |
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Routledge studies in epistemology ; 2.
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Contents |
1 Introduction; PART I Situating Disjunctivism; 2 Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality; 3 Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology; PART II Historical Antecedents; 4 Ancient Philosophy and Disjunctivism: The Case of the Stoics; 5 The Kantian Roots of Epistemological Disjunctivism; 6 Was Wittgenstein a Disjunctivist Avant la Lettre?; 7 Settling a Question: Austin and Disjunctivism; PART III Epistemological Disjunctivism: Prospects and Problems; 8 Disjunctivism and Realism: Not Naïve but Conceptual; 9 Epistemological Disjunctivism and Its Representational Commitments10 Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism; 11 Neither/Nor; 12 Disjunctivism and Credence; 13 Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person; PART IV Disjunctivism in Other Domains; 14 Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism; 15 Testimonial Disjunctivism; 16 Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge; 17 Ringers for Belief; 18 Disjunctivism and Other Minds |
Summary |
This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, including its relationship with perceptual disjunctivism, radical skepticism, and reasons for belief. Finally, the third group of essays extends the framework of epistemological disjunctivism to other forms of knowledge, such as testimonial knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and self-knowledge. Epistemological Disjunctivism is a timely collection that engages with an increasingly important topic in philosophy. It will appeal to researches and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
Notes |
Casey Doyle is Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Hilda's College, University of Oxford, UK. Joseph Milburn is a research fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, USA. Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and Director of the Eidyn research centre. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), and Epistemic Angst (2015) |
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Print version record |
Subject |
Knowledge, Theory of.
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Disjunction (Logic)
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epistemology.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Epistemology.
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PHILOSOPHY -- General.
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Disjunction (Logic)
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Knowledge, Theory of
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Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
Milburn, Joe, editor
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Pritchard, Duncan, editor
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Doyle, Casey, editor
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ISBN |
9781315106243 |
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1315106248 |
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9781351603560 |
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1351603566 |
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9781351603553 |
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1351603558 |
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9781351603546 |
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135160354X |
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