Introduction -- The historiography of appeasement -- Defining public opinion -- Locating representations of opinion -- Sources & methodology -- The prelude to Munich -- Chamberlain & Daladier -- Residual representations of opinion -- "War anxiety" and appeasement -- The Sudeten crisis -- The Munich Conference -- The aftermath of Munich, October-December 1938 -- After the honeymoon -- Domestic politics : France -- Domestic politics : Britain -- "Tunis, Corsica, Nice!" : towards a politique de fermeté -- Beware the ides of March, January-March 1939 -- Another Munich? : the Rome visit, January 1939 -- Strengthening the entente -- The French Left : a quest for cohesion -- "Bursting optimism breaks through the clouds" -- The Prague coup -- Repercussions of the Prague coup -- The immediate aftermath -- Peace by strength : British conscription & French redressement -- The "peace front" : residual perceptions of the Soviet Union -- The "peace front" : the opening exchanges -- Appeasement after Prague -- "Mourir pour Dantzig?" -- The Italian problem -- Perceptions of Daladier & Chamberlain -- Danzig : another Munich? -- Combating propaganda -- Public opinion and the Triple Alliance negotiations -- Public aspirations, governmental uncertainty -- "We want Russia" : public demand intensifies -- Impasse -- "Public opinion in all countries attaches the greatest importance to it" -- The negotiations collapse -- From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to war -- The Nazi-Soviet Pact -- Final efforts for peace -- The outbreak of war
Summary
The 1930s policy of appeasement is still fiercely debated more than 70 years after the signing of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Less examined is the role of public opinion on the formation of British and French policy in the period between Munich and World W
