| Description |
1 online resource : text file, PDF |
| Series |
Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics |
| Contents |
Cover -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Design and Methodology -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: Judicial Turnover in New Democracies: Forcing Judges off the Bench -- Judicial Turnover and the Manipulation of Courts in Theoretical Perspective -- Strategic Retirement Theory -- The Role of Political Competition as Political Fragmentation -- The Role of Political Competition as Electoral Uncertainty -- Regime Transition and Regime Effect |
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The Importance of the Constitutional Design of JudiciariesA Theory of Vacancy Creation and Manipulation of Courts in New Democracies -- Institutional Mechanisms of Vacancy Creation -- Non-InstitutionalMechanisms of Vacancy Creation -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3: The Political History of the Manipulation of the Argentinean Supreme Court -- The Traditional Way of Creating Vacancies: Natural Causes, 1916â#x80;#x93;1946 -- The Radical Administrations: 1916â#x80;#x93;1928 -- The Acordadas: A First Signal of Subordination (1930â#x80;#x93;1946) |
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A New Way of Creating Vacancies: Induced Retirements, 1947â#x80;#x93;2014Massive Impeachment: The Emergence of Induced Retirements as a Political Court-PackingStrategy (1946â#x80;#x93;1955) -- First Reinforcement: Political Court-Packingunder General Pedro Aramburu (1955â#x80;#x93;1958) -- Second Reinforcement: Double Political Court-Packingunder President Arturo Frondizi (1958â#x80;#x93;1963) -- First Frustrated Reinforcement under Arturo Illia (1963â#x80;#x93;1966) -- Third Reinforcement: Double Political Court-Packingunder General Juan Ongania (1966â#x80;#x93;1979) |
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Fourth Reinforcement: Political Court-Packingunder President Juan Peron (1973â#x80;#x93;1974)Fifth Reinforcement: Political Court-Packingunder General Jorge Videla (1976â#x80;#x93;1980) -- Sixth Reinforcement: Political Court-Packingunder President RaÃðl AlfonsÃƯn (1983â#x80;#x93;1989) -- Seventh Reinforcement: Double Political Court-Packingunder President Carlos S. Menem (1989â#x80;#x93;1999) -- Second Frustrated Reinforcement under President Fernando De la Rua (1999â#x80;#x93;2001) -- Third Frustrated Reinforcement under Eduardo Duhalde (2001â#x80;#x93;2003) |
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Eighth Reinforcement: Political Court-Packingunder President Nestor KirchnerConclusion -- Notes -- References -- Newspapers and Broadcasters -- Chapter 4: Forcing Justices off the Bench: Empirics from the Argentinean Supreme Court -- Vacancies in the Argentine Supreme Court: A Repertoire of Tactics of Forcing Judges off the Bench -- Model Selection -- Explanations for Induced and Natural Departures -- Political Alignment of the Justice with the Ruling Executive -- Timing of the Departure -- Partisan Power of the Executive in Congress -- Regime Effect |
| Summary |
"When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench??Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control. Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory, Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for studying manipulation of high courts.?"--Provided by publisher |
| Subject |
Political questions and judicial power -- Argentina
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Courts of last resort -- Argentina
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Judges -- Argentina
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Justice, Administration of -- Argentina
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Democracy -- Argentina
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Government -- Judicial Branch.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- World -- Caribbean & Latin American.
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Courts of last resort.
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Democracy.
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Judges.
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Justice, Administration of.
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Political questions and judicial power.
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Argentina.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781315271774 |
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131527177X |
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