| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Part 1. Perspectives on Grossman and Hart (1986) -- 1. Introductory remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986) / John Moore -- 2. Grossman-Hart (1986) as a theory of markets / Bengt Holmström -- 3. Remarks on incomplete contracting / Jean Tirole -- 4. Property rights and transaction cost theories / Steven Tadelis -- 5. GH and applied theory / Thomas Hubbard -- Part 2. Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries -- 6. Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries : new directions / Wouter Dessein -- 7. Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : New Directions" / Francine Lafontaine -- 8. Comment on "Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries : new directions" by Wouter Dessein / Michael D. Whinston -- Part 3. Incomplete contracts and internal organization -- 9. Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms / Phillipe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van Reenen -- 10. Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms" / John Roberts -- 11. The empirical implications of the Grossman-Hart model : comments on "Incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms" by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen / W. Bentley McLeod -- Part 4. Incomplete contracts and corporate finance -- 12. Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control / Patrick Bolton -- 13. Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control" / Efraim Benmelech -- 14. Why the incomplete contract approach is important for finance / Luigi Zingales -- Part 5. Incomplete contracts and business firms -- 15. Oliver Hart's contributions to the understanding of strategic alliances and technology licensing / Josh Lerner -- 16. Incomplete contracts and venture / Steve Kaplan -- 17. Incomplete contracts and the role of small firms / Jeremy C. Stein -- Part 6. Incomplete contracts and industrial organization -- 18. Contracts, ownership and industrial organization : past and future / Patrick Legros and Andrew F. Newman -- 19. Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization : past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman / Mathias Dewatripont -- 20. Discussion of "Contracts, ownership and industrial organization : past and future," by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman -- Kai-Uwe Kühn -- Part 7. Incomplete contracts and international trade -- 21. Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global : incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production / Pol Antràs -- 22. Comment on Pol Antràs : "Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global : incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production" / Elhanan Helpman -- 23. The Theory of the firm goes global / Dalia Marin -- Part 8. Incomplete contracts and public ownership -- 24. Incomplete contracts and not for profit / Paul Grout -- 25. Firm Ownership : the legacy of Grossman and Hart / Henry Hansmann -- 26. Ex-Ante anonymity and government allocation of property rights / Rohan Pitchford -- Part 9. Incomplete contracts and political economy -- 27. Political treaties as incomplete contracts / Bård Harstad -- 28. Incomplete contracts and political economy / Gerard Roland -- 29. Incomplete contracting and the design of constitutions / Guido Tabellini -- Part 10. Incomplete contracts, mechanism design and complexity -- 30. Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts / Eric Maskin -- 31. Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts / John Moore -- 32. Incomplete contracts and mechanism design / Richard Holden -- 33. Complexity and undescribability / Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini, and Leonardo Felli -- Part 11. Incomplete contracts, reference points and communication -- 34. New directions of incomplete contracts : reference points, communication, and renegotiation / Christian Zehnder -- 35. Some recent experimental evidence on contracts as reference points / Klaus Schmidt -- 36. Incomplete contracting in the field / Antoinette Schoar |
| Summary |
"The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession. It shows that the impact has been felt sometimes in significant ways in a variety of fields, ranging from the theory of the firm and their internal organization to industrial organization, international trade, finance, management, public economy, and political economy and political science. Beyond acknowledging how the property rights approach has permeated economics as a whole, the contributions in the book also highlight the road ahead--how the paradigm may change the way research is performed in some of the fields, and what type of research is still missing. The book concludes with a discussion of the foundations of the property rights, and more generally the incomplete contracting, approaches and with a series of contributions showing how behavioral considerations may provide a new way forward"-- Provided by publisher |
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"Papers on the impact that aproperty right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession"-- Provided by publisher |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Incomplete contracts -- United States
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Economics -- Theory.
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LAW -- Contracts.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Business Law.
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Incomplete contracts
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Bedrifter.
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Mikroøkonomi.
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Kontrakter.
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United States
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Aghion, Philippe, editor
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Dewatripont, M. (Mathias), editor.
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Legros, Patrick, 1958- editor.
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Zingales, Luigi, editor
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| ISBN |
9780190259020 |
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0190259027 |
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