| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover -- Impassioned Belief -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse -- Chapter 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious -- Chapter 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism -- Chapter 4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism -- Chapter 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem -- Chapter 6: Disagreement -- Chapter 7: Truth -- Chapter 8: Rationality -- 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse |
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1. Practically Normative Thought and Discourse: A Functional Gloss2. Evaluatives -- 3. Directives -- 4. Reasons -- 5. Locating the Normative -- Conclusion -- 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious -- 1. Normative Judgment: Action-Guiding -- 2. Normative Judgment: Affective -- 3. Normative Judgment: Acrimonious -- Conclusion -- 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism -- 1. The Many Ecumenical Cognitivisms -- 2. Implicative Ecumenical Cognitivism -- 3. Judgment-Individuating Ecumenical Cognitivism -- Conclusion |
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4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism1. The Expressivist Gambit -- 2. Pragmatics, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics -- 3. Ideationalism and Normative Propositions -- 4. Normative Perspectives: The Power of Negative Thinking -- 5. Normative Judgment -- 6. Normative Propositions -- 7. Advantages of Ecumenical Expressivism -- Conclusion -- 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem -- 1. What is the Frege-Geach Problem? -- 2. Unasserted Contexts and Compositionality: Non-Ecumenical Expressivism |
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3. Solving the Frege-Geach Problem: Offloading Logical Complexity4. Logical Validity: A First Pass -- 5. Logical Validity: Formality Regained -- 6. Intensional Contexts and Implicatures -- 7. Wishful Thinking -- Conclusion -- 6: Disagreement -- 1. Disagreement in Attitude -- 1.1 Mere difference without disagreement -- 1.2 Non-linguistic agents -- 1.3 Why privilege belief and desire? -- 1.4 Agent-relativity -- 2. Disagreement in Plan -- 2.1 Difference versus disagreement -- 2.2 Circularity -- 2.3 From practice to theory: a gap in the argument? |
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2.4 Impasse3. Disagreement in Prescription -- 4. Ecumenical Expressivism and Disagreement in Prescription -- Conclusion -- 7: Truth -- 1. Ecumenical Expressivism, Truth-Aptness, and Subjectivism -- 2. The Deflationist Gambit -- 3. The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism -- 4. Advantages of this Approach -- 5. The Explosion of the Normative? -- 6. What if Soames is Wrong? -- Conclusion -- 8: Rationality -- 1. Rational Capacities -- 2. Rationality as a Success Notion -- 3. Ecumenical Cognitivism Revisited -- 4. Discontinuities Revisited -- Conclusion |
| Summary |
We all form judgments about what ways of life are worthwhile, what we are morally required to do and so on. These so-called "normative" judgments have seemed puzzling in part because they exhibit both belief-like and desire-like features. Traditional cognitivist theories hold that these judgments are beliefs rather than desires; traditional non-cognitivist theories hold that they are desires rather than beliefs. Each of these traditions tries to accommodate or explain away what the_x000D_other tradition handles so easily. One often gets the sense that the defenders of these increasingly complex theories are trying to force a square peg into a round hole. So-called "hybrid theories" try to have the best of both worlds by understanding normative judgments as constituted by both_x000D_belief-like and desire-like states |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Norm (Philosophy)
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Practical judgment.
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Practical reason.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Social.
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Norm (Philosophy)
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Practical judgment
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Practical reason
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191505126 |
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0191505129 |
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1306477190 |
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9781306477192 |
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