| Description |
1 online resource (x, 229 pages) |
| Contents |
Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 The Roadmap -- 1.2 Kant on Hypothetical Imperatives -- 1.3 Contemporary Interest -- 1.4 Formulating Means-Ends Coherence: The Instrumental Belief -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2. Bootstrapping -- 2.1 Clarifying the Question -- 2.2 The Bootstrapping Objection -- 2.3 Rational Deliberation and Tie-Breaking Reasons -- 2.4 Promotion and Insufficient Means -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3. Scope -- 3.1 Rational Requirements -- 3.2 The Case for Wide-Scoping |
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3.3 The Case for Narrow-Scoping -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4. Normativity I -- 4.1 Normative Disjunctivism -- 4.2 Is Normative Disjunctivism True? -- 4.3 Does It Support the Myth Theory? -- 4.4 Conclusion -- 5. Normativity II -- 5.1 Reasons to be Rational -- 5.2 Against Strong Normativity -- 5.3 Subjective Oughts -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6. Belief -- 6.1 Cognitivism with the Strong Belief Thesis -- 6.2 Cognitivism without the Strong Belief Thesis -- 6.3 Problems for Cognitivism's Explanatory Claim -- 6.4 Conclusion -- 7. Intention -- 7.1 The Aim of Intention -- 7.2 Non-Normative Disjunctivism |
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7.3 Conclusion -- 8. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index |
| Summary |
Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why.0Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed June 19, 2020) |
| Subject |
Rationalism.
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Ends and means.
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Practical reason.
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rationalism (philosophy)
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Ends and means
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Practical reason
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Rationalism
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191063954 |
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0191063959 |
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