Title Kant's defense of common moral experience : a phenomenological account / Jeanine Grenberg

Published Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013

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Description 1 online resource (314 pages) Series Modern European Philosophy Modern European philosophy. Contents Acknowledgements; Getting Kant's joke: a phenomenological defenseof common moral experience; The common moral philosopher: admonishing the experts; The development of the practical problem; Reassertion of the common point of view; Chapter summary; Part I The interpretive framework; 1 Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality; Introduction; First-personal phenomenological experience; Common experience; Felt experience; Attention to felt experience; The attentive moral philosopher; 2 Response to immediate objections: experience; Introduction I. Different ways of appealing to experienceIntroduction; Two ways of appealing to experience; II. A new kind of experience: phenomenological, not empirical; III. New ways of appealing to experience: wonder and attentiveness; Introduction; The moral law as an object of wonder; Attending to our moral experiences; Conclusion; 3 Response to immediate objections: feeling; Introduction; I. The a priority of a common moral feeling; A special, a priori feeling; Moral feeling as common; II. The rejection of moral sense theory; Moral sense theory revisited Kant's use of feeling to affirm the practicality of pure reasonConclusion; Part II The Groundwork; 4 Kant's Groundwork rejection of a reliable experience of categorical obligation; Introduction; I. Kant's Groundwork appeal to the common; The practically wise common person; The fall of the common person; II. Critical analysis; Introduction; Common human experience as first-personal, felt, phenomenological experience; Two competing models of common-philosophical interaction; Problems in the common-philosophical relationship; III. Why Kant rejects a reliable experience of categorical obligation IntroductionGroundwork II arguments; Other reasons?; Conclusion; 5 The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III; Introduction; I. The phenomenological argument of Groundwork III; The felt phenomenological experience of freedom; From freedom to morality; The argument from freedom to morality; II. Analysis of the argument, part one: a successful introduction of felt phenomenological experience; Felt phenomenological experience in Groundwork III; The practical nature of Kant's grounding premise; The commonness and reliability of the felt experience III. Analysis of the argument, part two: the failure of Groundwork IIIIntroduction; The inadequacy of negative freedom; A failed effort at attentiveness; Failure of the movement from freedom to morality; Any hindsight saving of this argument?; Conclusion; Part III The Critique of Practical Reason; 6 Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason; Introduction; I. Allison's reading of the Fact of Reason; II. Fichtean, first-personal readings of the Fact of Reason; 7 The Gallows Man: the new face of attentiveness; Introduction; I. New confidence in an old, common, felt experience Summary Argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from common human experience of the conflict between happiness and morality Bibliography Includes bibliographical references Notes The Gallows Man as a common, felt, first-personal phenomenological experience Print version record Subject Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. SUBJECT Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 fast Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Kant, Immanuel) fast Subject Ethics. Phenomenology. Practical reason. ethics (philosophy) phenomenology. PHILOSOPHY -- History & Surveys -- Modern. Ethics Phenomenology Practical reason Form Electronic book ISBN 9781461936664 1461936667 9781107275300 110727530X 1299772846 9781299772847 9781139520126 1139520121 9781107541252 1107541255

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