Description |
1 online resource (31 pages) : illustrations, photographs |
Series |
Policy brief / Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2209-9689 ; report no. 23/2019 |
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Policy brief (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) ; report no. 23/2019 2209-9689
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Contents |
What's the problem? -- What's the solution? -- Introduction. -- China's civilian defence universities. -- The seven sons of national defence. -- Universities with national defence characteristics. -- Case study: The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. -- Espionage. -- Public and state security links. -- The overseas expansion of China's nuclear weapons program and defence industry. -- Defence industry. -- Nuclear weapons program. -- Areas for further research. -- Engaging with research partners in China. -- Recommendations for universities. -- Recommendations for the Australian government. -- Appendix: Universities supervised by SASTIND. -- Notes. -- Acronyms and abbreviations |
Summary |
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is building links between China's civilian universities, military and security agencies. Those efforts, carried out under a policy of leveraging the civilian sector to maximise military power (known as 'military-civil fusion'), have accelerated in the past decade. At least 15 civilian universities have been implicated in cyberattacks, illegal exports or espionage. China's defence industry conglomerates are supervising agencies of nine universities and have sent thousands of their employees to train abroad. This raises questions for governments, universities and companies that collaborate with partners in the People's Republic of China (PRC). There's a growing risk that collaboration with PRC universities can be leveraged by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or security agencies for surveillance, human rights abuses or military purposes. Universities and governments remain unable to effectively manage risks that come with growing collaboration with PRC entities. There's little accessible information on the military and security links of PRC universities. This knowledge gap limits the effectiveness of risk-management efforts |
Notes |
"First published November 2019." |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-31) |
Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed September 2, 2020) |
Subject |
Students, Foreign -- Risk assessment
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Chinese students -- Risk assessment -- Foreign countries
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Technology transfer -- Risk assessment
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Universities and colleges -- Security measures.
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Universities and colleges -- Security measures
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Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, publisher
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