| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 283 pages) : PDF file(s) |
| Contents |
Cover -- Half title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Market Design and Mechanism Design -- 1.2 Market Design and Mathematical Optimization -- 1.3 Outline of the Book -- 1.3.1 Part I Microeconomic Fundamentals -- 1.3.2 Part II Multi-Object Auction Design -- 1.3.3 Part III Approximation and Matching Markets -- 1.3.4 Part IV Appendices: Mathematical Optimization -- 1.4 Acknowledgements -- Part I Microeconomic Fundamentals -- 2 Game-Theoretical Basics -- 2.1 Normal-Form Games -- 2.1.1 Dominant-Strategy Equilibrium -- 2.1.2 Pareto Optimality -- 2.1.3 Nash Equilibrium -- 2.1.4 Correlated Equilibrium -- 2.1.5 Further Solution Concepts -- 2.2 Extensive-Form Games -- 2.3 Bayesian Games -- 2.3.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 2.3.2 Ex Post Equilibrium -- 2.4 Games and Human Behavior -- 2.5 Summary -- 2.6 Comprehension Questions -- 2.7 Problems -- 3 Mechanism Design -- 3.1 Social Choice -- 3.1.1 Voting Rules -- 3.1.2 Arrow's Impossibility -- 3.2 Utility Functions -- 3.3 Mechanism Design Theory -- 3.4 Quasi-Linear Mechanism Design -- 3.4.1 Quasi-Linear Utility Functions -- 3.4.2 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism -- 3.4.3 The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem -- 3.5 Summary -- 3.5.1 Robust Mechanism Design -- 3.5.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design -- 3.5.3 Dynamic Mechanism Design -- 3.5.4 Non-Quasi-Linear Mechanism Design -- 3.6 Comprehension Questions -- 3.7 Problems -- 4 Single-Object Auctions -- 4.1 Single-Object Auction Formats -- 4.2 Model Assumptions -- 4.3 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in the IPV Model -- 4.3.1 Ascending Auctions -- 4.3.2 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 4.3.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 4.3.4 Descending Auctions -- 4.4 Comparing Equilibrium Outcomes -- 4.5 Robustness of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem -- 4.5.1 Risk-Averse Bidders -- 4.5.2 Interdependent Values -- 4.5.3 Asymmetry of Bidders |
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4.5.4 Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders -- 4.6 Bidder Collusion -- 4.7 Optimal Auction Design -- 4.8 Selected Experimental Results -- 4.9 Summary -- 4.10 Comprehension Questions -- 4.11 Problems -- Part II Multi-Object Auction Design -- 5 An Overview of Multi-Object Auctions -- 5.1 General Equilibrium Models -- 5.2 Multi-Unit Auction Formats -- 5.2.1 Sealed-Bid Multi-Unit Auction Formats -- 5.2.2 Open Multi-Unit Auction Formats -- 5.2.3 Sequential Sales -- 5.3 Multi-Item Auction Formats -- 5.3.1 Simultaneous Auctions -- 5.3.2 Combinatorial Auctions -- 5.4 Online and Dynamic Auction Design -- 5.5 Summary -- 5.6 Comprehension Questions -- 6 The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction Format -- 6.1 SMRA Rules -- 6.2 Tactics in the SMRA -- 6.3 Strategic Situations in SMRA -- 6.3.1 War of Attrition -- 6.3.2 English Auction vs. War of Attrition -- 6.4 Summary -- 6.5 Comprehension Questions -- 7 Sealed-Bid Multi-Object Auctions -- 7.1 Generic Bid Languages -- 7.2 The Winner Determination Problem -- 7.3 Payment Rules -- 7.3.1 Pay-as-Bid Payment Rules -- 7.3.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Payment Rules -- 7.3.3 Bidder-Optimal Core Payment Rules -- 7.4 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies -- 7.4.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 7.4.2 Bidder-Optimal Core-Selecting Auctions -- 7.5 Domain-Specific Compact Bid Languages -- 7.5.1 Procurement Markets with Economies of Scale and Scope -- 7.5.2 Distributed Scheduling in TV Ad Markets -- 7.6 Combinatorial Double Auctions -- 7.7 Empirical Results -- 7.8 Summary -- 7.9 Comprehension Questions -- 7.10 Problems -- 8 Open Multi-Object Auctions -- 8.1 Primal-Dual Auctions for Assignment Markets -- 8.1.1 Dual Prices and VCG Payments -- 8.1.2 An Ascending Auction for the Assignment Problem -- 8.2 Greedy Auctions and Matroids -- 8.3 Models of Open Combinatorial Auctions -- 8.3.1 Limits of Linear Prices |
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8.3.2 Algorithmic Models of Ascending Auctions -- 8.3.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with General Valuations -- 8.3.4 Large Markets with Non-Convexities -- 8.4 Overview of Open Combinatorial Auction Formats -- 8.4.1 Auction Formats with Non-Linear Prices -- 8.4.2 Auction Formats with Linear Ask Prices -- 8.5 Empirical Results -- 8.5.1 Experiments with Small Markets -- 8.5.2 Experiments with Larger Markets -- 8.6 Summary -- 8.7 Comprehension Questions -- 8.8 Problems -- 9 The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats -- 9.1 The Single-Stage Combinatorial Clock Auction -- 9.1.1 Auction Process -- 9.1.2 Efficiency of the SCCA -- 9.2 The Two-Stage Combinatorial Clock Auction Format -- 9.2.1 Auction Process -- 9.2.2 Activity Rules -- 9.2.3 A Note on Revealed Preference Theory -- 9.2.4 Strategies in the Two-Stage CCA -- 9.3 Experiments on the Two-Stage CCA -- 9.4 Summary -- 9.5 Comprehension Questions -- 9.6 Problems -- Part III Approximation and Matching Markets -- 10 Approximation Mechanisms -- 10.1 Approximation and Truthfulness -- 10.1.1 Deterministic Approximation Mechanisms -- 10.1.2 Randomized Approximation Mechanisms -- 10.2 Deterministic Mechanisms for Single-Minded Bidders -- 10.2.1 Greedy-Acceptance Auctions -- 10.2.2 Deferred-Acceptance Auctions -- 10.3 Randomized Mechanisms -- 10.3.1 The Relax-and-Round Framework -- 10.3.2 Combinatorial Auctions via Relax-and-Round -- 10.4 Summary -- 10.5 Comprehension Questions -- 11 Matching Markets -- 11.1 Overview of Matching Problems -- 11.2 Two-Sided Matching -- 11.2.1 Definitions and Notation -- 11.2.2 The Gale-Shapley Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism -- 11.2.3 The Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism -- 11.3 One-Sided Matching -- 11.3.1 The Top Trading Cycle Mechanism -- 11.3.2 The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism -- 11.4 One-Sided Matching with Complementarities |
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11.4.1 Multi-Unit and Combinatorial Assignments -- 11.4.2 Cardinal Assignment Problems with Complementarities -- 11.5 Applications and Empirical Results -- 11.6 Summary -- 11.6.1 Two-Sided Matching Mechanisms -- 11.6.2 One-Sided Matching Mechanisms -- 11.7 Comprehension Questions -- 11.8 Problems -- 12 Outlook -- 12.1 Challenges in Market Design -- 12.2 Going Forward -- Part IV Appendices: Mathematical Optimization -- A Linear Optimization -- A.1 Geometry of Linear Programs -- A.2 Feasibility -- A.3 Duality Theory -- A.4 Integrality of Linear Programs -- B Algorithms and Complexity -- B.1 Computational Complexity -- B.2 Algorithms for Linear Programs -- B.3 Algorithms for Integer Linear Programs -- B.4 Approximation Algorithms -- B.4.1 Complexity Classes -- B.4.2 LP-Based Approximation Algorithms -- References -- Index |
| Summary |
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets |
| Notes |
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Jan 2018) |
| Subject |
Markets -- Mathematical models
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Supply and demand.
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Statistical matching.
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Game theory.
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Game Theory
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Game theory
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Markets -- Mathematical models
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Statistical matching
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Supply and demand
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781316779873 |
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1316779874 |
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1107173183 |
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9781107173187 |
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