A temporary fix on eastern Ukraine's front line has become, by oversight or neglect, a semi-permanent "solution", like so much in the Ukrainian crisis today. In the ab- sence of a genuine settlement, most parties would probably welcome a frozen con- flict, even though they are unwilling to say so publicly. But the situation on the ground is too unstable to guarantee even this. There are too many troops far too close to each other. A crucial agreement to withdraw heavy weaponry from the bat- tlefield is violated daily by both sides. The needs of many thousands of civilians stuck along the line and the many grievances of troops who are fighting there have been ignored. A number of issues need to be addressed immediately. A substantial distance -- much more than the 100 or so metres currently common -- should separate the sides. Military positions and civilian settlements should be clearly distinguished. These are not just requirements for Kyiv. The separatists should take the same steps. The DNR and LNR have shown neither capacity nor interest in doing so. Kyiv should do better
Notes
"18 July 2016."
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references
Notes
Online resource; title from PDF caption (ICG, viewed August 26, 2016)
