| Description |
1 online resource (viii, 122 pages) |
| Contents |
Venture Capital and the Corporate Governance of Chinese Listed Companies; Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: An Introduction to Adaptive Efficiency and Corporate Governance; Chapter 2: The Status Quo of Corporate Governance of Chinese Listed Companies; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 A Historical Perspective: The State-Owned Enterprises; 2.2.1 Traditional Model (1950-1984); 2.2.2 Transitional Model (1984-1993); 2.3 Modern Corporate Model (1993 to Present): A Substantial Transformation of SOEs?; 2.3.1 The Shareholder Meeting; 2.3.2 The Board of Directors; 2.3.3 The Supervisory Committee; 2.4 Conclusion |
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Chapter 3: The Difficulty of Fundraising Suffered by Chinese Domestic VCs3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Profile of the Fundraising of American VCs; 3.3 The Reflection of Chinese Domestic VCs' Fundraising in the American Mirror; 3.3.1 The Absence of Pension Funds from Their Real Involvement in the Chinese VC Market; 3.3.2 The Lack of Independence of Venture Capitalists in GVCs; 3.3.2.1 Piercing the Veil of GVCs: Empirical Evidence from the Interview; 3.3.2.2 Evidence from the Case of the China New Technology Venture Investment Corporation; 3.3.2.3 The IGF: Has an Upheaval Really Occurred? |
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3.4 ConclusionChapter 4: The Underdevelopment of Incentives in the Operation of Chinese Domestic VCs; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Answers Provided by the American Model; 4.3 The Underdevelopment of Incentive Mechanisms in Chinese Domestic VCs: The Shadow of the Control-Based Model; 4.3.1 Limited Partnership; 4.3.2 Staged Financing and Board Representation; 4.3.3 Convertible Preferred Stocks; 4.3.4 Stock Options; 4.4 Conclusion; Chapter 5: The Lack of Efficient Exit Channels for Chinese Domestic VCs; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Availability of Tailor-Made Stock Markets to American VCs |
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5.3 The Exit of Chinese Domestic VCs Through Chinese Domestic Stock Markets: An Uneven Road5.3.1 Main Boards; 5.3.2 The SME Board; 5.3.3 The GEM; 5.4 Conclusion; Chapter 6: The Lower Level of Risk Tolerance of Chinese Domestic Venture Capitalists; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Comparison of Risk Tolerance: Findings from Empirical Studies; 6.3 The Lower Risk Tolerance of Chinese Domestic Venture Capitalists: What the Control-Based Model Explains; 6.3.1 Risk Absorption and Incentive Inadequacy: The Reflection of Parentalism; 6.3.1.1 Fraudulent Information Disclosure; 6.3.1.2 Hostile Takeovers |
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6.3.1.3 Bankruptcy6.3.2 Severe Funding Shortage: An Old Problem; 6.4 Conclusion; Chapter 7: Conclusion; 7.1 Chinese Political Reform: The Establishment of a Public Servant Government; 7.2 The Reform of Corporate Governance: Divesting State-Owned Shares; 7.3 The Harmonization Principle: Agency Costs and Adaptive Efficiency; 7.4 The Prospect of the Two Reform Missions: Political Entrepreneurs Versus Path Dependence; Bibliography |
| Summary |
State-controlled listed companies have always dominated Chinese stock markets. As a result of the rampant scandals related to them, there have been voluminous academic efforts to explore their corporate governance, underpinned by agency costs. However, these studies have yet to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of venture capital and adaptive efficiency. During the last ten years, despite China's remarkable progress in the development of its venture capital market, its domestic venture capital has been marginalized by American competitors. Given the different performance between them, the author contends that the corporate governance system of Chinese state-controlled listed companies has hampered the performance of the institutional factors which are responsible for the prosperity of American venture capital in Chinese venture capital markets. With the practice of American venture capital as the mirror, he empirically demonstrates that Chinese domestic venture capital lacks the four factors related to the success of their American counterparts: large and independent funding, application of incentive mechanisms, efficient exit channels, and a high risk tolerance level. More importantly, these defects as a whole are closely linked to the corporate governance of state-controlled listed companies. Considering the potential negative consequences on economic and social development, the author identifies policy reforms underway to harmonize agency costs and adaptive efficiency |
| Analysis |
Economics |
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Economics/Management Science |
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Economics/Management Science, general |
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Finance/Investment/Banking |
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R & D/Technology Policy |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Government business enterprises -- China -- Management
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Corporate governance -- China
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Venture capital -- China
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industrial Management.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Management.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Management Science.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Organizational Behavior.
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Science économique.
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Affaires.
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Corporate governance
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Government business enterprises -- Management
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Venture capital
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China
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781461412816 |
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1461412811 |
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