| Description |
xvi, 645 pages : illustrations |
| Contents |
1. Introduction -- 2. The basic structure of repeated games with perfect monitoring -- 3. The folk theorem with perfect monitoring -- 4. How long is forever? -- 5. Variations on the game -- 6. Applications -- 7. The basic structure of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring -- 8. Bounding perfect public equilibrium payoffs -- 9. The folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring -- 10. Private strategies in games with imperfect public monitoring -- 11. Applications -- 12. Private monitoring -- 13. Almost public monitoring games -- 14. Belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games -- 15. Reputations with short-lived players -- 16. Reputations with long-lived players -- 17. Finitely repeated games -- 18. Modeling reputations |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Economics, Mathematical.
|
|
Game theory.
|
| Author |
Samuelson, Larry, 1953-
|
|
Oxford University Press.
|
| LC no. |
2005049518 |
| ISBN |
0195300793 (alk. paper) |
|
9780195300796 |
|
