Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Dedication; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface and Acknowledgments; 1 Ruling against the Rulers; 2 The Logic of Strategic Defection; 3 A Theory of Court-Executive Relations; 4 Judges, Generals, and Presidents; 5 The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle; 6 The Dynamics of Defection; 7 Conclusion; Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court; Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set; Appendix C Equilibria Proofs; References; Index
Summary
This study offers a new theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict the longstanding assumption that only independent judges rule against the government of the day
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 195-207) and index
