| Description |
xv, 221 pages |
| Series |
Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
|
Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
|
| Contents |
1. Ruling against the rulers -- 2. The logic of strategic defection -- 3. A theory of court-executive relations : insecure tenure, incomplete information, and strategic behavior -- 4. Judges, generals, and presidents : institutional insecurity on the Argentine supreme court, 1976-1999 -- 5. The reverse legal-political cycle : an analysis of decision making on the Argentine supreme court -- 6. The dynamics of defection : human rights, civil liberties, and presidential power -- 7. Conclusion : broader lessons and future directions -- App. A. Overview of the federal Argentine judiciary and the Argentine supreme court -- App. B. The Argentine supreme court decisions data set -- App. C. Equilibria proofs |
| Summary |
"This study offers a new theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book challenge the longstanding assumption that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study brings together qualitative case studies and statistical analyses with spatial and game theoretical model to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government."--BOOK JACKET |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Political questions and judicial power -- Argentina -- History -- 20th century.
|
|
Civil-military relations -- Argentina -- History -- 20th century.
|
| SUBJECT |
Argentina -- Politics and government -- 1983-2002. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85007070
|
| Author |
MyiLibrary.
|
| LC no. |
2004052120 |
| ISBN |
0521820596 HB |
|
