| Description |
1 online resource (220 p.) |
| Series |
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Ser |
|
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Ser
|
| Contents |
Cover -- Half-title -- Series information -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 0.1 Game Plan -- Part I KRA: The Knowledge Rule of Assertion -- Chapter 1 The Case for the KRA -- 1.1 Lottery Propositions -- 1.2 Moorean Conjunctions -- 1.3 Parenthetical Position -- 1.4 Challenges and Prompts -- 1.5 Legitimate Criticisms and Appropriate Responses -- 1.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 2 Problems for KRA -- 2.1 The Classical Counterexamples -- 2.1.1 The Cases -- 2.1.2 Criticisms and Blame: A Basic Normative Framework |
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2.2 Conversational Patterns: Turning the Tables on KRA -- 2.2.1 Taking Back Assertions -- 2.2.2 The Target of 'How Do You Know?' Challenges -- 2.3 A Priori Simplicity -- 2.4 Outstanding Problems -- 2.4.1 Goals and Norms -- 2.4.2 Selfless Assertions -- 2.4.3 Assertions under Systematic Peer Disagreement -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 3 KRA and Sufficiency -- 3.1 The Quantitative Objection -- 3.1.1 Brown on Overriding -- 3.1.2 Epistemic Norms and Norms with Epistemic Content -- 3.2 The Qualitative Objection -- 3.2.1 Expert Testimony -- 3.2.2 Aesthetic Judgements -- 3.2.3 Objections and Replies |
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3.3 Back to Goldberg -- 3.4 Conclusion -- Part II FFAA: A Function First Account of Assertion -- Chapter 4 FFAA -- 4.1 Etiological Functions and Their Normative Import -- 4.1.1 Etiological Functions -- 4.1.2 Two Kinds of Norm -- 4.1.3 Etiological Functions and Evaluative Norms -- 4.1.4 Typing Norms -- 4.2 The Normativity of Assertion -- 4.2.1 The E-Function of Assertion -- 4.2.2 The Evaluative Norm of Assertion -- 4.3 Function First or Rule First? -- 4.3.1 Assertions of Moorean and Lottery Propositions -- 4.3.2 Theoretical Motivations |
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4.3.3 Cases of Selfless Assertion: Theoretical Considerations -- 4.3.4 Cases of Selfless Assertion: Intuitive Considerations -- 4.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 5 FFAA and KRA -- 5.1 Extant Accounts -- 5.1.1 Bach and Hindriks -- 5.1.2 Douven -- 5.2 The Status and Rationale for KRA: A Function First Account -- 5.2.1 E-Functions and Prescriptive Norms -- 5.2.2 The Case of Assertion -- 5.2.3 Goals and Norms Again -- 5.3 Conclusion -- Chapter 6 FFAA and the Duty to Believe -- 6.1 Testimonial Injustice and the Duty to Believe -- 6.1.1 Fricker on Testimonial Injustice -- 6.1.2 To Each Their Due |
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6.1.3 Injustices, Rights, and Duties -- 6.1.4 Two Kinds of Testimonial Injustice -- 6.2 Extant Accounts -- 6.2.1 Presumption-Based Accounts -- 6.2.2 Goldberg's Purport-based Account -- 6.3 The Duty to Believe: A Function First Account -- 6.4 Conclusion -- Part III Knowledge and Language -- Chapter 7 KRA and Constitutivity -- 7.1 Extant Arguments against KAA -- 7.1.1 Pagin -- 7.1.2 Cappelen -- 7.1.3 Maitra -- 7.2 A New Argument against KAA -- 7.2.1 Another Engagement Condition -- 7.2.2 Some Cases Involving Assertions -- 7.2.3 KAA: A Negative Result -- 7.3 Objections and Replies |
| Summary |
This book develops a novel account of assertion in terms of its function of sharing knowledge |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
|
7.4 Constitutivity without KAA |
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Simion, Mona
|
| ISBN |
9781009041096 |
|
1009041096 |
|
