| Description |
1 online resource (xv, 266 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Advances in consciousness research, 1381-589X ; v. 21 |
|
Advances in consciousness research ; v. 21. 1381-589X
|
| Contents |
The Phenomenology Problem -- The Metaphysical Problem -- The Need to Go Beyond -- Nonconceptual Experience -- A Preliminary Case for Nonconceptual Experience -- The Ancient Pedigree of Nonconceptualism -- Some Reasons to Think Experience is Nonconceptual -- Perceptual Illusions and Noticing Aspects -- The Imagery Debate -- The Fine-grainedness of Experience -- Experience, Conceptual Description and Theory -- The Conceptual Expression of Experience -- The Role of Experience in Interpretation -- On Simulation and Basic Communality -- The Off-line Processing Proposal -- The Introspective Modelling Proposal -- The Nonsensicality of Behavioural Meaning -- From a Sensational Point of View -- Is Experience Theory-Resistant? -- The Verstehen Version of the What-it-is-like Argument -- The Failings of the Knowledge Argument -- Know How = Experience and Ability -- The Virtues of the Knowledge Argument -- Rejecting the Strong Representationalist Thesis -- The Rejection of Standard Representational Theories -- The Best of Intentionality -- The Subject and Subjectivity -- The Representationalist Dilemma -- Changing the Subject -- Avoiding the Subject -- The Failure of Explanatory Physicalism -- Functionalism and the Why-Question -- Abstract Functionalism -- Homuncular Teleofunctionalism -- From Functionalism to Physicalism -- What's the Matter with Explanatory Physicalism? -- Reductive Physicalism -- The Criterion Objection -- The Multiple Realizability Objection -- The Intelligibility Objection -- Eliminativist Physicalism |
| Summary |
Unlike standard attempts to address the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness, which assume our understanding of consciousness is unproblematic, this book begins by focusing on phenomenology and is devoted to clarifying the relations between intentionality, propositional content and experience. In particular, it argues that the subjectivity of experience cannot be understood in representationalist terms. This is important, for it is because many philosophers fail to come to terms with subjectivity that they are at a loss to provide a convincing solution to the mind-body problem. In this li |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 238-266) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Consciousness.
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Philosophy.
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Consciousness
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Philosophy
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Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical
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philosophy.
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PSYCHOLOGY -- Personality.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
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Philosophy
|
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Consciousness
|
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Bewustzijn.
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Fysicalisme.
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Idealisme.
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| LC no. |
00022533 |
| ISBN |
9789027283436 |
|
9027283435 |
|
902725141X |
|
9789027251411 |
|
