| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I The Nature of Law -- 1. The Nature of Legal Philosophy -- I. The Nature of Philosophy -- II. Pre-Understanding and Arguments -- III. Three Problems -- IV. Four Theses -- V. Entities and Concepts -- VI. Necessary Properties -- VII. Law and Morality -- 2. On the Concept and the Nature of Law -- I. The Practical and Theoretical Significance of the Debate -- A. Statutory Injustice and the Radbruch Formula -- B. Law's Open Texture and the Self-Understanding of Jurists -- C. The Concept of Law as a Concept of a Non-Natural Kind -- II. Positivism and Non-Positivism -- A. Separation Thesis and Connection Thesis -- B. Exclusive and Inclusive Positivism -- C. Exclusive, Inclusive, and Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism -- III. Concept and Nature -- A. Nature -- B. Concept -- IV. The Dual Nature of Law -- A. Coercion -- B. Correctness -- V. What the Law Is and What It Ought to Be -- 3. The Dual Nature of Law -- I. The Ideal -- A. The Claim to Correctness -- B. Discourse Theory -- II. The Real -- III. The Reconciliation of the Ideal and the Real -- A. Outermost Border -- B. Democratic Constitutionalism -- 4. Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights -- I. Positivism, Non-Positivism, and the Existence Problem -- A. Three Elements and Two Dimensions -- B. Two Forms of Positivism -- C. Three Forms of Non-Positivism -- D. Inclusive Non-Positivism and the Existence Problem -- II. The Existence of Human Rights -- A. Human Rights as Moral Elements -- B. The Concept of Human Rights -- C. The Justifiability of Human Rights -- 5. An Answer to Joseph Raz -- I. Separation Thesis -- A. Kelsen's Statement -- B. The Idea of a Definition of Law -- C. Necessary Connections -- II. Participants and Observers -- III. The Argument from Correctness -- IV. The Argument from Injustice |
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V. The Argument from Principles -- 6. The Ideal Dimension of Law -- I. The Claim to Correctness -- II. Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Necessities -- A. The Argument from Fruitlessness -- B. The Argument from Deficiency -- III. The Necessity of the Real Dimension of Law -- IV. A Conceptual Framework -- A. First-Order and Second-Order Correctness -- B. Observer and Participant -- C. Perspectives and Dimensions -- D. Classifying and Qualifying Connections -- V. The Relation between the Real and the Ideal Dimension -- A. The Radbruch Formula -- B. The Special Case Thesis -- C. Human Rights -- D. Democracy -- E. Principles Theory -- 7. Gustav Radbruch's Concept of Law -- I. Gustav Radbruch's System -- A. The Law Triad -- B. The Idea Triad -- C. The Triad of Purpose -- II. The Radbruch Formula -- Part II Constitutional Rights, Human Rights, and Proportionality -- 8. The Construction of Constitutional Rights -- I. The Rule Construction -- A. Rules and Principles -- B. The Postulate to Avoid Balancing -- C. Problems of the Rule Construction -- II. Principles Construction and Proportionality Analysis -- III. Objections to the Principles Construction -- IV. The Rationality of Balancing -- A. The Central Role of the Rationality Problem -- B. The Irrationality Objection -- C. Pareto-Optimality -- D. The Law of Balancing -- E. The Weight Formula -- 9. Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation -- I. Balancing -- A. Two Objections -- B. The Structure of Balancing -- II. Constitutional Review -- III. Representation -- A. Argumentative Representation -- B. Conditions of True Argumentative Representation -- 10. The Existence of Human Rights -- I. The Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Existence Question -- II. The Concept of Human Rights -- III. The Justification of Human Rights -- A. The Principles Structure of Human Rights |
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B. Scepticism and Non-Scepticism -- C. Justification and Thesis -- D. Eight Justifications -- 11. The Weight Formula -- I. The Norm-Theoretic Basis: Rules and Principles -- II. The Principle of Proportionality in the Narrower Sense -- III. The Triadic Scale -- IV. The Formula -- V. The Extended Formula -- 12. Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics -- I. The Problem -- II. Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory -- A. Rules and Principles -- B. Proportionality -- C. Weight Formula -- III. The Concept of Formal Principle -- IV. Principles and Balancing in General -- V. The Wrong Way -- VI. Two Kinds of Discretion -- VII. Second-Order Epistemic Optimization -- VIII. Formal Principles and Discretion -- 13. Ideal 'Ought' and Optimization -- I. The Index Model of the Ideal 'Ought' -- II. The Law of Competing Principles -- III. The Weight Formula -- IV. Law of Competing Principles and Law of Balancing -- V. A Fundamental Equivalence -- VI. Poscher's Argument from Identity -- VII. Sieckmann's Reiterated Validity Obligations -- 14. Human Dignity and Proportionality -- I. Absolute and Relative Conceptions of Human Dignity -- II. Practical Significance -- III. Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory -- A. Rules and Principles -- B. Proportionality -- C. Weight Formula -- IV. The Concept of Human Dignity -- A. Descriptive and Normative Elements -- B. The 'Double-Triadic' Concept of Person -- C. Human Dignity as a Bridge Concept -- V. Human Dignity as Principle and as Rule -- A. Human Dignity as Principle -- B. Human Dignity as a Rule -- VI. Devaluation of Human Dignity? -- A. Clear Cases -- B. Object Formula -- C. Abstract Weight and Epistemic Reliability -- D. Rationality -- 15. Proportionality and Rationality -- I. Empirical and Analytical Approaches -- II. Proportionality and Principles Theory -- A. Rules and Principles -- B. Proportionality |
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III. Balancing and Argumentation -- A. The Formal and the Substantive Dimension of Rationality -- B. Numbers, Classification Propositions, and their Justification -- C. Disagreement, Discourse, and Rationality -- IV. Balancing, Universalizability, and Legal Certainty -- A. The ad hoc Problem -- B. The Law of Competing Principles -- C. Rules and Conditions -- 16. The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights -- I. The Absolute and the Relative -- II. Constitutional Rights -- A. Constitutional and Human Rights -- B. The Degree of the Absolute Dimension of Constitutional Rights -- III. Proportionality -- A. The Absoluteness of the Principle of Proportionality -- B. The Relativity and Absoluteness of the Application of the Principle of Proportionality -- Part III. Argumentation, Correctness, and Law -- 17. A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason -- I. Introduction -- II. In Defence of the Concept of Practical Reason -- III. A Kantian Conception of Practical Rationality: Discourse Theory -- A. The Basic Idea of Discourse Theory -- B. The Status of Discourse Theory as a Theory of Practical Correctness and Rationality -- C. Towards the Justification of the Rules of Discourse -- D. The Application of Discourse Theory -- 18. Problems of Discourse Theory -- I. Discourse Theory as a Procedural Theory -- II. Rules of Discourse -- III. The Ideal Discourse -- A. The Problem of Construction -- B. The Problem of Consensus -- C. The Problem of the Criterion -- D. The Problem of Correctness -- IV. The Real Discourse -- A. The Discursive Modalities -- B. The Relative Concept of Correctness -- 19. Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse -- I. Models -- A. The Model of Deduction -- B. The Model of Decision -- C. The Hermeneutic Model -- D. The Model of Coherence -- II. A Discourse Theory of the Law -- A. General Practical Discourse |
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B. Institutionalization -- III. Legal Argumentation -- A. The Different Kinds of Legal Arguments -- B. The Strength of the Arguments -- 20. Jürgen Habermas's Theory of the Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication -- I. The Problem of Rationality in Adjudication -- II. Three Insufficient Answers -- III. Ronald Dworkins's Theory of Rights -- IV. Law as an Ideally Coherent System of Norms -- V. Theory of Legal Argumentation -- VI. The Special Case Thesis -- A. Moral, General Practical, and Legal Discourse -- B. The Rules and Forms of Legal Discourse -- C. Unjust Law -- D. Specific Legal Nature? -- 21. Law and Correctness -- I. The Concept of the Claim to Correctness -- A. The Subjects -- B. The Addressees -- C. Raising a Claim -- II. The Necessity of Connecting Law and Correctness -- A. An Absurd Constitutional Article -- B. An Absurd Judgment -- C. The Alternative -- III. Legal and Moral Correctness -- A. Law's Open Texture -- B. The Autonomy Objection -- C. The Objection of Impossibility -- D. Reality and Ideal -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects |
| Summary |
This collection provides a comprehensive account of Robert Alexy's legal theory. It is divided into three parts: the nature of law; constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality; and the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law |
| Notes |
Vendor-supplied metadata |
| Subject |
Law -- Philosophy.
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Human rights -- Philosophy
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Constitutional law -- Philosophy
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Constitutional law -- Philosophy
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Human rights -- Philosophy
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Law -- Philosophy
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780192516961 |
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0192516965 |
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9780191838507 |
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0191838500 |
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