| Description |
1 online resource (306 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TYPE IDENTITY; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 1: Acquaintance and the mind-body problem; 1 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT; 2 DESIDERATA FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 4 THE QUOTATIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 2: Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research; IDENTITY, REDUCTION, AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION |
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THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION VIEWED FROM A MECHANISTIC PERSPECTIVEMODEL SYSTEMS, CONSERVED MECHANISMS, AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION; CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Property identity and reductive explanation; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: A brief history of neuroscience's actual influences on mind-brain reductionism; 1 TRANSLATIONAL REDUCTION; 2 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION; 3 FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION; 4 METASCIENTIFIC REDUCTION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 5: Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties; KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTING TO KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT |
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THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS |
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5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES |
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CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A PHYSICALIST |
| Summary |
Argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states |
| Notes |
8 conclusion |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
English |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Dualism.
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Typology (Psychology)
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Materialism.
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dualism.
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materialism (philosophical movement)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
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Dualism
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Materialism
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Typology (Psychology)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Hill, Christopher S
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| LC no. |
2011044364 |
| ISBN |
9781139338349 |
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113933834X |
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9781139336604 |
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1139336606 |
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9780511687068 |
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0511687060 |
|
1139334107 |
|
9781139334105 |
|
1107226422 |
|
9781107226425 |
|
1280393890 |
|
9781280393891 |
|
9786613571816 |
|
6613571814 |
|
1139337475 |
|
9781139337472 |
|
1139339923 |
|
9781139339926 |
|
1139341502 |
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9781139341509 |
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