| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover; Hume, Passion, and Action; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Hume's Texts and Abbreviations Used; Introduction; 0.1 Historical Context; 0.2 A Sketch of Hume's Characterization of Reason and Passion; 0.3 Method of Interpretation and Preview of the Arguments; 1: Motives to Action; 1.1 Motives and Reasons: Some Clarifications; 1.2 Overview of Hume's Characterization ofthe Passions; 1.2.1 The Direct and the Indirect Passions; 1.2.2 Direct Passions, Natural Instincts, and the General Appetite for Good; 1.3 Which Passions Are Motives?; 1.4 Summary |
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2: Hume's Argument for the Inertness of Reason2.1 What Is the Target of Hume's Argument?; 2.2 "Reason Alone Can Never Be a Motive"; 2.3 Does Hume's Argument Allow that Beliefs Motivate Even If Reason Does Not?; 2.3.1 Recent Interpretations; 2.3.2 Difficulties with Recent Interpretations; 2.4 An Interpretation that Beliefs Alone Are Not Motives; 2.4.1 Historical Considerations; 2.4.2 The Treatise Account of the Origin of Motivating Passions; 2.4.3 Consistency with Other Treatise Texts; 2.4.4 Later Hume Texts: Taste as the Source of Motivation |
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2.4.5 Some Further Observations on this Interpretation3: Belief: Some Complications; 3.1 Hume's Characterization of Ideas; 3.2 Hume's Characterization of Belief; 3.2.1 Belief as a Lively Idea; 3.2.2 Belief as the Manner of Conception; 3.2.3 More on Belief and Sentiment; 3.2.4 Belief as Dispositional; 3.3 Is the "Direction-of-Fit" Argument Derived from Hume?; 3.4 Objects of Belief and Objects of Reason; 4: The Passions as Original Existences; 4.1 Reason Generates No Impulses or Attractions; 4.2 The Features of Original Existences |
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4.2.1 Critique of Hume's Characterization of the Passions as Non-representations4.2.2 Critique of Hume's Characterization of the Passions as "Sensations"; 4.3 A Defense of Hume's Conception of the Passions; 4.3.1 The Phenomenal Conception; 4.3.2 The Structural Conception; 4.4 "Unreasonable" and "Reasonable" Motivating Passions; 4.5 Has Hume Effectively Countered the Rationalists?; 5: Morality and Motivation; 5.1 Hume's Motivation Argument; 5.2 Moral Internalisms; 5.3 The Natural-Motive Interpretation; 5.4 The Moral-Discernment Interpretation |
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5.4.1 An Externalist Account of How Moral Discernment Motivates5.4.2 Are the Moral Sentiments of Approval and Disapproval Motives?; 5.4.3 Moral Discernment and Hume's Theory of Motivation; 5.4.4 Further Considerations; 5.5 Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Cognitivism; 5.5.1 Ideas of Morality; 5.5.2 Judgments, Beliefs, and Motivation; 5.5.3 Are Ideas of Morality Fictions?; 6: Motivational Dynamics andRegulation of the Passions; 6.1 Strength versus Violence; 6.2 Natural Influences on the Passions; 6.2.1 Conversion of One Passion into Another; 6.2.2 Contrariety and the Role of the Understanding |
| Summary |
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe presents an original interpretation of David Hume's famous theory of action and motivation, according to which passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. She argues that according to Hume beliefs cannot move us to action without feeling, and she explores the implications for Hume's theory of morality |
| Notes |
6.3 How Others' Passions Affect Us: Sympathy and Comparison |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Criticism and interpretation
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| SUBJECT |
Hume, David, 1711-1776 fast |
| Subject |
PHILOSOPHY -- History & Surveys -- Modern.
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| Genre/Form |
Criticism, interpretation, etc.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780192557674 |
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019255767X |
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9780191862908 |
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0191862908 |
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