Introduction : multilateralism and the generals -- The value of multilateral legitimacy -- Institutions, burden sharing, and the American military -- Haiti, 1993-94 : multilateral approval to ensure a UN handoff -- Bosnia, 1992-95 : the generals did not want to "own" it -- Kosovo, 1998-99 : NATO's buy-in reassures the generals -- Iraq, 1998-2003 : the top-ranking generals remain silent
Summary
Why did American leaders work hard to secure multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for military interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, while making only limited efforts to gain such approval for the 2003 Iraq War? This book illuminates little-known aspects of U.S. decision making in the run-up to those interventions
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes
In English
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