Early warnings and early action by bystanders -- The tribunal's interpretation and implementation of the genocide convention -- Rwandan history -- Undermining UNAMIR -- The installment of UNAMIR with Belgian participation -- Early warning of atrocities in 1991-1994 -- Early warnings from November to January -- The genocide fax and the prohibition from U.N. headquarters to act -- The negative response of New York and capitals in the west to the deteriorating situation -- Deteriorating security in Rwanda and the negative response from New York from January up until March -- Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a stronger and firmer broadened mandate for UNAMIR -- UNAMIR : its mandate and the offending Belgian role -- The start of the genocide -- Evacuation -- Belgian decision to withdraw its troops -- The response of the Security Council -- The role of the Netherlands throughout the genocide -- Apologies from bystanders ten years later
Summary
Talks about the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the research focuses on why the early warnings of an emerging genocide were not translated into early preventative action
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 279-289) and index
Notes
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English
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